CHINA THROUGH WESTERN EYES

Manuscript Records of Traders, Travellers, Missionaries and Diplomats, 1792-1942

Part 6: Correspondence and Papers of Sir Ernest Satow (1843-1929) relating to China from Public Record Office Class PRO 30/33

EXTRACTS

REEL 89
A wide variety of private correspondence and papers document subjects such as: the present state of China; Russian and Japanese movements; the Russo-Chinese Bank; travel details, the Board of Trade; British Legation Staff; trade with China; the ‘Sianam’ piracy case and the policing of the West River, War
Office correspondence; commerce tariffs; reportings from various national and regional newspapers; the enforcement of English law in China; India’s interest in China. Writers include: Lord Lansdowne, Francis Bertie, Francis Campbell, Mr Barrington (FO London), Walter Rangley, Dr H. A. Giles, Charles Harding, Sir Edward Grey, St. John Broadwick, William Cowan, Mr R. T. Tower.

Dear Sir Ernest Satow
I do not think the Russian contention that they have a right to build a railway from Shanhaikwan to Peking can be sustained, although they may be able to show that they can build as far as the Great Wall. In regard to Legation Guards and Posts . . . I hold strongly that we have no business to lock up a large number of men in or around Pekin. Nor does it seem to me to matter much whether within reasonable limits the different Powers concerned decide upon keeping guards of the same strength. The demands of the military people were certainly extravagant in the first instance and I hope that you have been able to moderate their enthusiasm.
My telegram of the 30th will show you that I had come to much the same conclusions as you had in regard to the questions of indemnity and evacuation. What we have to look out for is a sudden outburst of impatience here or elsewhere which would lead to urgent demands for a precipitate withdrawal. If we are to act in accordance with the spirit of the joint note, we ought not to commence withdrawing until we are reasonably satisfied that the Chinese are complying, or able and willing to comply with our
demands . . .
Foreign Office (April 9, 1901) (PRO 30/33 - 7/1)

My dear Satow
Affairs in China and Japan are in a condition which makes it important that you and Macdonald should have a general knowledge of European and near Eastern politics as well as those in your quarters of the globe.
We have therefore added largely to the series of confidential print supplied to you. If you find any of the new series useless pray let us know and it shall be discontinued. Lord Lansdowne thinks it desirable also that you should have for the present for your personal information the daily sections of telegrams printed for the Cabinet and I enclose a first instalment herewith.

Yours very sincerely
T. A. Sanderson, Foreign Office (January 1, 1904)
(PRO 30/33 - 7/3)

My dear Satow
. . . As to railways, the more I see of the matter the more I am impressed by the unsatisfactoriness of the conditions under which we compete with other Powers in China. I noticed in one of your letters to Campbell your observation that “while we have no money to spend on railways in this country, our rivals have plenty. The French have actually been offering large sums for the construction of the Szechuen-Hankow line, while we could not get a penny even if we had a concession in our pockets.”
Now we are being continually attacked for our alleged remissness in obtaining our share of these oncessions, but the fact seems to be that even when we get them the money is not forthcoming. We are sure to hear more of this charge, and I think it would be a good thing if you would collect all the concrete cases available in which the foreigner has appeared upon the scene with full pockets - filled either by his Government or by private investors gifted with more courage than the British concessionaire appears to possess.
I was much interested in your account of Rockhill’s views about Tibet. I did not know that the U.S. Government felt so strongly upon the subject. What Rockhill told you explains the observations which upon one of two occasions Choate has made to me on the subject of the Lhassa expedition. They generally took the form of an enquiry whether what we were doing affected the rights of China in Tibet. I could not quite make out what he was driving at. Your answer to Rockhill was, I think, quite appropriate. I hope a good impression will be produced by the moderation of our terms. I am however rather distressed at finding that the repayment of the indemnity is to be spread over a period of 75 years. This seems to me altogether too long. A punitive indemnity which hits a generation yet unborn is surely a mistake, and I am afraid the length of the term will suggest the idea that we wish to find a pretext for retaining a lien, upon the country.
If the Chinese go to a Gold Standard they will do a really big thing. I think you are right to give the idea all the encouragement you can. You should certainly do all in your power to persuade the Chinese that such a scheme is one which they cannot possible carry out themselves. By all means let us work with the Americans. If there is to be an Imperial Bank, it would, if an Englishman is impossible, be much better to have an American at the head of it than any other foreigner. I think you will be fortunate if so large a scheme is carried through before the war is over.
It may however be long before that time comes. From your letter of the 28th it is evident that, like many of us, you made a too sanguine forecast. It looks to me as if both sides were exhausted after the tremendous struggle which we have been witnessing during the last few days, and I shall be surprised if the Japanese bring off a big coup in the neighbourhood of Mukden.
Do not let us give any encouragement to the idea that, supposing Port Arthur to fall, Wei-hai-Wei automatically reverts to the Chinese. The fall of Port Arthur leaves the Russian lease still in existence, and the Russians will probably say that they intend to retake the place. Agreements of this kind ought not to be construed as if they were documents drawn up in Lincoln’s Inn. We shall at any rate have plenty of time to consider the matter.
With best thanks for your letters
Yours sincerely
Lansdowne (Foreign Office, Derreen, Kenmare, Co. Kerry,
September 14, 1904) (PRO 30/33 - 7/3)

Mr dear Satow
Your conversation with the Japanese M.P. was most interesting. I have looked again at Asakaw’s book, and I feel no doubt that the Japanese policy with regard to Corea and Manchuria is correctly described therein. They will certainly be allowed to have their own way in Corea. I broached this subject to Mr Loomis during his visit here, and also to Senator Lodge who came to dine with me; and found them both strongly in favour of giving Japan a free hand there. Neither of them sounded that note of alarm as to the
possibility of an inordinate Japanese predominance in Eastern Asia. I hope Vladivostok will be left to Russia: she cannot do much harm there. On the other hand, if she were cut off from the Pacific, she would be driven to look for an outlet elsewhere, probably at our expense, and a spot which is not vulnerable would cease to be so. I cannot make out that there is any real difference between our policy and that of the United States, although they are probably more frightened at the idea of the Yellow Peril than we are.
By the time you read this letter our Agreement with Japan will, I hope, have been signed. I do not feel so sanguine as to the
conclusion of peace. At this moment the opinion in diplomatic
circles is pessimistic, but people have probably been too much impressed by the erratic conduct of the Czar and by the
statements attributed to Witte by the press reporters.
Yours
Lansdowne (Foreign Office, August 3rd, 1905) (PRO 30/33 - 7/4)

My dear Satow
On January 19 we received the following cryptic telegrams from Drummond of Shanghai, ‘Chinese is as India was in 1857’!
I told Sir E. Grey we understood here that said Drummond was wild if not somewhat cracky, but that we were told he did associate a good deal with the Chinese, and that his opinions as to Chinese feeling should not perhaps be disregarded altogether?
Sir E. Grey did not think we need take any official action, but thought I might write to you and say he would be glad if you would report officially of and when anything more came to the knowledge of the Legation . . .
Yours sincerely
Francis Campbell (January 22, 1906) (PRO 30/33 - 7/5)

REEL 90
Correspondence from Walter Hillier, Mr Jamieson, Mr Browne, Henry Cockburn, R. T. Tower, W. Russell, Walter Townley, F. E. Wilkinson, Sir J. L. Mackay, Lancelot Carnegie
Topic discussed include: the construction of the Peking and
Kalgan Railway; British interests in the Mangzle Valley; the plague in Manchuria; the Szechuen railway; reports in newspapers such as the Shuntien Pao, the Tih Tih Pao, the Hu Pu, the Peking
Gazette; Japanese interests in China; provincial punishments;
local rumours and gossip; Port Arthur naval base; trade marks; Anglo-Russian boundary.

Dear Sir Ernest
. . . If a Commission is going to sit in Shanghai to discuss Art. XI, we ought to avail ourselves of the opportunity to secure a privilege - too long denied - freedom of trade between India and Tibet. On the do ut des principle, we might obtain it by giving way in the matter of Hong Kong waiving the point of territorial sanctity and allowing the Imperial Maritime Customs to collect revenue in a section of their harbour. It will be difficult to safeguard Colonial ‘face’, but from an Imperial point of view, the matter is of so great importance that local prejudices might well go by the board.
Yours very truly
Jamieson (Shanghai, September 23, 1901) (PRO 30/33 - 7/9)

Dear Sir Ernest
I have the following on very good authority. Kuropatkin, who is expected to arrive in Moukden tomorrow, was to assume full control in the Far East, and Pavloff was ordered to join him as diplomatic Secretary. After K. had started from St. Petersburg, Pavloff’s orders were countermanded and he was instructed to report himself to the Viceroy. This was held to be an indication of influences at work against Kuropatkin, who is apparently not a persona grata with the Court circles in the Russian capital. The day before yesterday a third telegram reached Pavloff, telling him to await farther orders, from which the inference is drawn that Kuropakin has refused to play second fiddle. From all that I can gather a spirit of bitter mutual jealousy prevails amongst the Russian leaders.
A somewhat amusing true story was told me last night by the sender of the telegram. The Russian ilitary Agent here got to know of a cure for dysentery, which has proved very efficacious in Tonking and the Philippines. Not caring too incur the cost of telegraphing the whole prescription, he in the first instance
telegraphed to the Viceregal Headquarters to ask if they would like to have it. It was the first telegram, which he addressed to them at Voukden [?], after their retirement from Port Arthur, and he could not understand why he did not receive any reply. On mentioning this to Pavloff, the latter asked to see the text of the message.
After reading it he remarked: ’Well, you could hardly expect them to answer that. It read ‘Shall I send you a remedy for Dysentry?’
Yours sincerely
Jamieson (Shanghai, March 23, 1904) (PRO 30/33 - 7/10)

REEL 91
Reel 91 begins the run of correspondence sent to Satow by staff at the regional consular offices.
Writers include: R. W. Mansfield (Amoy), James Scott and L. Campbell (Canton), P. E. O’Arien Butler and Archibald Rose (Chefoo), Herbert Goff (Chêngtu), Walter Clennell [?] (Chiananfu), B. G. Tours [?] (Chingkiang), E. C. Wilton (Changking).
Subjects include: Holiday leave, missionary work, deaths from typhoid, land regulations, taxes and tariffs, travel details and itineraries, customs and excise duties, British trade, religious conflicts, Canton-Hankow Railway construction, The Mackay Treaty, consular staff pay, reports on movements of foreign troops (Japanese, Russian, German), iron-ore mining, rail routes, meetings with representatives from major banks/financial sector, movements of Royal Court, expedition into Ssuchuan [Szechuen].

Dear Sir Ernest
There are signs that there may be trouble here between the Roman Catholic and Protestant converts. Of course I look upon the ex-parlé statements of Protestant missionaries on this subject as very much biased, but I have just had very strong proof that there is a good deal of truth in their changes that the RCs interfere most unjustifiably in cases in which they have no concern. In the latter’s part of August last year there was a small case of the looting of a chapel of a village in the Anchi district. The magistrate there is openly antiforeign and I could not get it settled though all the other cases which occurred at the same time were finished and done with two months ago . . .
R. W. Mansfield (Amoy, April 17, 1901) (PRO 30/33 – 8/1)

Dear Sir Ernest
I was so glad to receive your Telegram No. 2. All along I have been doing my best to oppose these schemes, and will now continue my efforts in that direction.
As events have turned out, I am finding an active supporter in the U.S. Consul – He and the French Consul have parted company and are bitter enemies; their quarrel began over Missionary questions; then differences arose in connection with their Settlement matters; and now the U.S. Consul has entered the lists against his French Colleague over Railway claims – Mr. McWade taking up the American Syndicate and their Hankow – Canton Line.
The U.S. Consul assures me that he has ceased to agitate any further in Settlement Concession matters: and that his one effort will be directed to opposing French aggression in Canton. The French Consul remarked to me one day that he and his American Colleague had had some misunderstanding . . . The Maritime Customs have encountered the full force of the wrath of the French Consul in Customs matters generally and more especially over the seizure of the French Launch Sang Li for smuggling opium . . . The chief point is that the French Consul contends that, under Extra-territoriality, no French property can in any way be touched or seized by the Customs without first receiving the necessary assent of the French Consul; the Joint Investigation Rules of 1868 and all the procedure of the past thirty years are of no account nor in the least binding on French subjects.
Yours obediently
James Scott (Canton, 10th February 1902) (PRO 30/33 – 8/2)

REEL 92
Mainly hand written letters and reports from consular staff in the Chinese regions. Writers include: P. E. O’Arien Butler (Foochow), Mr Fraser, Mr Pelham, Mr Warren and Mr Flaherty (Hankow), W. Holland and R. Willis (Ichang), W. J. Clennell and E. C. Werner (Kinkiang), Hubert Higgs and M. Hughes (Kiungchow) and again E. C. Werner in Kongmoon.
The usual subjects of travel, personnel issues, and weather conditions are reported as well as: taxation, Inland Water Regulations, Royal Court general gossip, British, German and Japanese trade in China, Customs regulations, commercial treaty negotiations, the Chên-Chou murders, China Inland Mission,
reports in Chinese Papers maligning foreign governments, military and trade ships in port.

Dear Sir Ernest
I understand that the Viceroy here was the originator of the idea that the Viceroys generally should telegraph to Siam protesting against the signing of the proposed convention with Russia. He appears to be very anti-Russian and as decidedly pro-English, the latter tendency probably prompting him to send Mr Peng as often to see me.
Dr Myers the new doctor at Pagoda who moved recently across from Takow informed me that the Japanese were taking a peculiar interest in Chinchew. I spoke about this to Mr Peng and suggested that it would be a good thing to check Japanese aspirations in that direction to declare the place a Treaty Port, thus following the precedent of Santu which was opened to baffle the Germans. He said he would speak to the Viceroy about it. The next day he returned and told me the Viceroy cordially approved of the plan but wanted the initiative in the matter to be on our side . . .
P. E. O’Arien Butler (Foochow, April 16th, 1901) (PRO 30/33 – 8/9)

Dear Sir Ernest Satow
I omitted in my memo of your conversation with the Viceroy the reference to the four dangerous ex-Boxers about whom I wrote to you at his request. The Viceroy was afraid that a demand for a greater punishment than perpetual exclusion from office would rouse serious opposition; but he thought that, if you spoke or wrote a red note to Prince Ch’ing, these four men would be shelved forever. He was anxious that his name should not appear in the matter which could, he thought, be easily arranged and he expressed great apprehension as to the result of letting the Vice President continue his career.
Fraser (Hankow, 29/11/01) (PRO 30/33 – 8/10)

REEL 93
Dear Sir Ernest
I have just telegraphed to you that Viceroy Liu died this morning at 9 o’clock. He had been ailing for some time but as his condition was not supposed to be serious his death was quite unexpected . . . a telegram . . . is expected from Peking tomorrow announcing who is to be placed in temporary charge of the post . . . it is the earnest wish of everyone in the Province that En Shou [?] the present Governor of Foochow should be Liu’s successor. En Shou [?] was Provincial Treasurer here during the Boxer troubles and is said by some people in fact by every body here to have strongly supported the viceroy in his policy. On the other hand Mr Drummond’s private inquiry agents made him out to be the head of the Boxer party in Nanking. He is popular with the foreigners here, but has no experience to speak of of foreign affairs and is not, I imagine, a man of much ability. His appointment will mean that the present clique of officials will retain their posts and an endeavour will be made to continue the old viceroy’s policy. From the same source I learn that the appointment most dreaded by the clique is that of Chang Chih Tung. The latter would naturally bring his own hangers on with him and places would have to be found for them at the expense, of course, of the present officials. I believe that the dread generally expressed of his financial policy is genuine. He is said, when acting here in 1895, to have remitted large sums out of the local revenues to Wuchang to save the numerous enterprises in which he was
interested from bankruptcy and to have even gone so far as to raise a foreign loan for the purpose, subsequently paid off by him on his return. There can be no doubt that he had proved an utter failure as a financier in his present post . . .
Dickinson (H. B. M. Consulate, Nanking, 6 October 1902)
(PRO 30/33 – 8/16)

Dear Sir Ernest Satow
. . . All that I have heard goes to show that the Manchurian & Siberian railway lines are working well, much better, it would seem, than most people expected. A correspondent who went up to Moukden and beyond at the beginning of March told me that he saw five or six trains passing every day with not only troops & munitions but also provisions. Several regiments (or parts of regiments) with artillery have already arrived in South Manchuria from the Warsaw & Moscow districts. The artillery, I am told, is
extremely well horsed and the horses are in good condition. I was much struck with the appearance of the few I saw the other day.
I am told that there are eight squadrons of cavalry in the neighbourhood of Chin chou Bay which have recently come out from Europe . . . Nothing is known or heard here of the movements of the Japanese. A Russian told me that they (the Japs.) had 20 bands of brigands in their pay and that the Russians
had about 2,000, but little or no credence can be attached to statements of this kind.
Yours sincerely
H. A Little (H. M. Consulate, Newchwang, April 10, 1904)
(PRO 30/33-8/18)

Dear Sir Ernest Satow
. . . I have heard on good authority that there are some forty or fifty Japanese in the neighbourhood of Chin Chou who are no doubt military men, as there were only five or six Japanese settled in that place before the outbreak of war.
Yesterday occurred another of those cases of arrest and detention of foreigners which according to the records seem to be of rather frequent occurrence . . . I am going to see the Civil Administrator about the matter. It has occurred to me that in order to lessen the risk of these unpleasant affairs it might be well for me to issue to British Subjects Certificates of Identity with a certified Russian translation attached.
There was a scare at the fort last night & a number of shots from the big guns were fired at an imaginary enemy. The native boats in the neighbourhood got frightened & tried to cross to the other side of the river contrary to the regulations not to move after dark. This led to their being fired on with the result that two boatmen were killed.
Yours very truly
H. A. Little (Newchwang, April 11, 1904) (PRO 30/333-8/18)

Retreat of Russian troops from Liad Fung Peninsula

Dear Sir Ernest Satow
I think it best to turn the following into a private letter as I now learn that the Japanese appear to have stopped advancing and that the Russians are again moving south, so that I am in doubt as to what is really happening.
I have the honour to report that in consequence of the severe defeat suffered at or near Wa Fang Kou on the 15th the Russian force sent south to relieve Port Arthur is now in full retreat, a small rear guard being at Kaichou and the remainder at Ta Shih Ch’aio. The Japanese appear to be marching north in pursuit and have already reached a point some little way this side of Hsiung Yao. The forces engaged in the battle were as regards numbers pretty evenly matched, the Russians being somewhat over 30,000 and the Japanese probably not more than 35-40,000, and the defeat seems almost entirely due to the superiority of the Japanese artillery fire. The Russian casualties amounted to over 3,000 killed and wounded.

Yours very truly
H. A. Little (H. M. Consulate, Newchwang, June 22, 1904)
(PRO 30/33-8/18)

Dear Sir Ernest Satow
Mr Grosse & all other Russians left last Thursday, the 28th. Grosse was very much cut up & one couldn’t help feeling sorry for him. He seems to have quite lost his head when the Japanese scouts entered his grounds . . . Proclamations have been issued by the Japanese explaining the causes of the war & also offering rewards for the apprehension of persons who acted as interpreters to the Russians, but I have not yet obtained copies of them. I am told several interpreters were executed at Kaichou - probably at the instance of the Chinese officials . . . The Chinese say the Russians lost heavily last week in fighting around Haicheng. We are having lovely weather.
Yours very truly
H. A. Little (Newchwang, July 30, 1904) (PRO 30/33-8/18)

Dear Sir Ernest Satow
. . . I wish to add one or two remarks to my report, concerning some rather interesting admissions I got from Père Marqué in the course of our conversations. He is young and unsophisticated, and holds that political influence and the means adopted by missionaries to obtain it for themselves or others, do more harm than good to the cause of Christianity. He said that many French missionaries consider they and their consuls gain influence with the Chinese, and add to the numbers of their converts, by putting through their lawsuits for them, and helping them when their officials are after them. But, he said, they often get badly taken in, and the class of converts they make are a very poor lot as a rule. . . . There seems to be something going on around here, but I can’t make out what is up. The officials seem almost included to favour the French, though whether it is through fear, or interest or promises of future reward, I am unable to say.
I am, dear Sir Ernest Satow,
Yours sincerely
V. Savage (Pakhoi, 15th April 1907) (PRO 30/33-8/20)

REEL 94
Dear Sir Ernest Satow
Commercially Swatow flourishes, though the foreign inland is mainly conformed shipping. Politically nothing is going on here, nor could it as far as I can see. The only other excitement is missionaries and these are quieter of late. RC methods are somewhat extraordinary on occasion. Their mission were involved in a land suit against a Protestant.
In order to harden matters one of their priests ? the head of an armed force arrested the defendant, and on my protesting against this to the Laot’ai [?], I was informed that he could not let the man go and rearrest him so I suggested because he was accused of being the murderer of a French Priest; the priest in question died of dysentery as two qualified medical practitioners are willing to testify.
Yours very sincerely
R. Willis (Swatow, 9th September 1903) (PRO 30/33-9/1)

Dear Sir Ernest
After a period of comparative quiet - which began with the departure of the French from Yunnan last year - the tranquillity of this province again stands a very fair chance of being disturbed. M. François, whose aggressive action certainly caused the riots at Yunnan Fu last June, has again returned to that place as
consul - with the title of Consul General. The Chinese officials look upon his re-appointment as a direct insult, after all that has occurred; and if the French govt. are bent on a peaceful policy, it seems strange that they should have chosen a man detested by the Chinese to carry it out.
Yours very faithfully
Fred. Carey (Szernao, via Hong Kong, Rangoon & Kengtung,
12th May, 1901) (PRO 30/33-9/2)

Dear Sir Ernest
Although I was pretty sure that the military authorities are keeping you fully informed with regard to the incident here I thought it advisable to send you my summary of the situation by telegraph. As it is a purely military matter I shall not report it to you in a despatch unless you wish me to do so.
I just heard of the Russian doings at noon on Friday, and shortly afterwards I ran by rickshaw along the French Bank [?] opposite to get a view of the proceedings. A Russian tent was pitched on the bank close to the siding, on railway ground, a Russian flag was planted on it, and a Russian guard was gathered about it. A dozen or so Cossacks were delving with shovels in a desultory sort of fashion - making a “shelter trench to fire from”. The Russian officer in command said this shelter trench was being dug around the British guard of Madras ? who viewed the Russians proceedings with great calmness. All the same I did not like the look of officers in the least.
Yours very truly
L. C. Campbell (Tientsin, March 17, 1907) (PRO 30/33-9/4)

Yusn shik kai [?] to Mr Campbell (February 26th 1901)

. . . The whole district then was convulsed by the disturbances created by the Chikli [?] rebels. These risings were of no ordinary kind and are much to be regretted. It is fortunate that England and other nations in sincere friendship, are making every effort to assist us, and can, out of the present crisis, restore peace ensuring future good-understanding. In this Chinese and foreigners alike rejoice with one mind . . . The Chikli rebels burst into Shantung last summer and all but stirred up a great rebellion. I took immediate and resolute measures in their suppression, and in all arrested and punished not less than five or six thousand of these fierce bandits.
In spite of the vast size of this province, wherein were places in which it was impossible to take effective measures the leaders have, yet, one by one been destroyed, and the remaining gangs have been frightened out of the place.
For a long time past the whole of the country under my jurisdiction has been submissive and peaceful; the missionaries of all nations have one after the other returned to the interior to pursue their
labours and converts and non-converts are gradually resuming good relations. I tell you this so as to relieve any anxiety you may feel.
(PRO 30/33-9/4)

Dear Sir Ernest
Some time ago a Captain Battine, one of our Special Service Officers out here, left for England. About the time he left, or before, there were, it seems, rumours of German negotiations or aspirations for the purchase of the China Merchants Fleet. Since reaching England, Captain Battine seems to have been moving on the matter, and he has just sent my informant the following telegram.
“Found competent purchaser China Merchants Steamship obtain option mail fullest details companies position keep business secret Government favourable cable acknowledgment. As far as my informant knows the China Merchants don’t now want to sell. If H.M.G is ‘favourable’ they will or have doubtless let you know. But in any case, I said, I must communicate the item to you, which my informant of course saw.
Believe me
Sincerely Yours,
L. C. Hopkins (Tientsin, 18 September 1901) (PRO 30/33-9/5)

My dear Hopkins
The Japanese Government has advised China to remain strictly neutral in case of war breaking out, and Prince Ching has agreed, admitting as he must that no other course is open to him.
The Japanese Minister Communicated to Mr Conger and myself with great exactness by order of his government, the grounds on which they gave this advice to China, so that when war breaks out it is the duty of a power unfortunately compelled to become belligerent, to endeavour to restrict the war of hostilities as much as possible in order to avoid interfering with the commerce of the neutral powers; so that it is equally the duty of a belligerent to abstain from [?] other powers into the fray. So that if China were to take part in the conflict, great excitement would be produced in the country, and it might be difficult for the government to preserve order in the provinces and at the ports.
Yours sincerely,
Ernest Satow (Peking, 16 January 1904) (PRO 30/33-9/5)

REEL 95
Dear Sir Ernest Satow
The Secretary of State has now definitely decided against the Viceroy’s proposal that I should go through Tibet into Assam, very much to my disappointment as I am genuinely interested in the border tribes. I daresay, however, that this interest is ephemeral and will dwindle away when I have put India and things Indian behind me.
As you know, our negotiations here are at a standstill, although I venture to hope China will eventually accept the Adhesion Agreement. The abolition of Chinese mediation between Tibet and India seems, however, to be a pill almost too big to pass the Chinese gullet. There is no doubt whatever that it would be a blow to her dwindling prestige and a corresponding enhancement of ours in Tibet. The Lhasa Authorities have been abiding by the outcome of the Tang negotiations with intense anxiety; swayed, at one moment, by the honeyed lies of the Amban who has been telling them that, just as his representations induced the Emperor of China to force us to forego 50 Lakhs of the indemnity, so Tang Tachan has orders to compel us to give up the trade marks and to substitute the Yatung Convention for the Lhasa Treaty. They become truculent and overbearing in manner, then the remembrance of the presence of British troops in the Potala awakens them with a shock and they cringe and whine that they are weak and poor. . . . If Tang appears to have held the extraordinary idea, peculiar to mandarins no doubt, that he could win over Lord Kitchener by humouring his well-known partiality for Chinese
porcelain, and so influence the negotiations in his favour . . . The Curzon-Kitchener episode has of course been the great topic of Simla conversation this summer. The former appears to command general sympathy, even among the larger section of the military, and it is the general opinion - to use a sporting phrase - that the Viceroy has been given out leg before wicket although the ball did not pitch straight. I am afraid that the negotiations in India have been a great tax on you. It plainly shows, if proof were needed, that India cannot do without the legation in Chinese affairs. They don’t like admitting it; but I cannot at times resist judiciaries rubbing the fact into them. I have a great admiration for the work in India of the Indian civilian, but he seems to regard Imperial questions from the most limited point of view.
Yours truly
E. C. Wilton (c/o The Foreign Department, Calcutta 10.10.05) (PRO 30/33-9/11)

My Dear Satow
I had a conversation with Knappe after his return which leads me to think that the question of intervention in favour Russia is again under consideration. I expressed the opinion that the war might
be a very protracted one and he said yes, unless the powers interfere. I did not know that that was likely, but he added if Russia is badly beaten early in the war. I got nothing more definite.
Yours sincerely
Wilkinson (Shanghai, April 16, 1904) (PRO 30/33-9/12)

REEL 96
Dear Sir Ernest Satow
Since your departure I have several times thought over the question of Currency arrangements in China on which you spoke to me. You did not give me any information as to the course likely to be adopted in naming persons to definitely formulate the proposed reforms, and eventually superintend their execution. Presumably, affairs are not yet sufficiently advanced for you to be able to say anything at all definite on this part of the question even now. At the same time it strikes me as quite probable that an International Committee of Experts (or of supposed experts) may assemble in Peking to formulate definite proposals, and I venture to write to say that should such a course be adopted at a season when I was prepared to leave India I should be very glad, on reasonable terms, to be named British Representative.
I remain
Yours sincerely,
E. H. Law (Simla, 8th September 1903) (PRO 30/33-9/16)

Dear Sir Ernest
I have just received your letter of the 3rd. How correctly you diagnosed the Japanese position that they will take Port Arthur I have little doubt. Though probably the loss of men will be very great but I shall be surprised if they attempt to push their advance beyond ? if indeed they do not content themselves with creating a strong line of fortresses along the Corean frontier. Then if the Russians persist the war will ultimately be determined by the bankers and hostilities will cease for want of money.
Sincerely yours
Henry ? (Queens College, Nuwara Eliya, 31 May 1904)
(PRO 30/33-9/17)

REEL 97
Dear Sir Ernest
I have heard nothing whatever of any proposed expeditions against the Chinese troops, entrenched about 10 miles to the West Huailu. I should say it would be much better in the interest of all parties if the Chinese authorities were to avoid any chance of a collision.
I don’t think our govt. would care to be involved in further operations but no doubt you know better that I do.
Alfred Gaselee (Peking, 13th April 1901) (PRO 30/33-9/18)

My Dear General
In reply to your letter of the 17th asking about Japanese landing at or near Newchwang, and being driven into the province of Chihto, the proper answer would be that China having declared her neutrality extends to the portion of Manchuria that lies between the Liao [?] river and the Great Wall. If the defeated troops of either belligerent crossed the Liao river west ward, it would be her duty to disarm them and [?] them at a distance from the frontier. Whether she could actually effect this is another question.
If they entered the province of [?] the powers would be bound, I think, to give her their moral support in carrying out her duties as a neutral.
The Japanese Govt. have declared their intention of respecting the neutrality of China between the Liao River and the Wall, as to which Japan has not as far as I know yet pronounced herself.
Satow (18.2.04) (PRO 30/33-9/20)

Sir, (Lt. General Sir Alfred Gaselee K. C. B.)
I have the honour to acknowledge the receipt of your letter of the 12th instant, enclosing a report by Captain G. de S. Barrow, Police Commissioner Chinese city, with reference to the removal of
proclamations from the temple at which rice was being distributed to the Chinese poor by agents of the Russo-Chinese Bank, and informing me that Captain Barrow has now been directed to absolutely prohibit any further distribution except under his own orders.
The Russian Minister called upon me on the 13th instant with reference to this matter. He informed me that it was at the personal desire of H. M. the Emperor that arrangements had been made for distributing to the poor the rice in the possession of the Russian Authorities. The necessary instructions had been transmitted by M. de Witto to the Agent of the Russo-Chinese Bank, and he himself had received instructions to give all the assistance in his power. He said that he had warned M. Pokotilof from the
beginning not to post any notices in the street, but that the officer had taken down one that was posted in the 3rd courtyard of the temple of which use had been obtained for the purpose of
distribution.
. . . Under these circumstances, as it appears to me very desirable to remove any ground for complaint that the beneficent intentions of H. M. the Emperor had been frustrated by the action of the British Police Commissioner I should be glad if you could see your way to removing the prohibition intimated in the last paragraph of your letter, and to allowing the distribution to go on as before, provided that no notice is posted outside the building.
I have the honour to be, Sir,
Your most obedient, humble servant,
Ernest Satow (Peking, 17th January 1901) (PRO 30/33-9/21)

REEL 98
Dear Sir Ernest
. . . I hear the XIIth Division are now in and around Ping Yang and that the opposing outposts face each other.
Mackintosh told me he had received a wire from [?] saying Russians had posted sentries along the railway - he did not know how far westward but Foley has gone to Y-K and will tell me all about it.
Cowan is proving obdurate and is going to fight the matter on the point of law - muzzling the press he calls it! Fenton says he sent a Reuter home about it at Cowan’s request and that Cowan had said he would publish the whole story.
Yours sincerely,
A. Wright (Tientsin, 4.3.04) (PRO 30/33-9/22)

Detailed report of attack on Kinchow
The enemy built several covered trenches around the forts of Nanshan and offered stubborn resistance under strong defence works. Nevertheless after several attempts we finally succeeded to take enemy’s position by storm, driving the enemy towards Nankuenling This severe fight continued sixteen hours.
Admiral Togo telegraphs that the Captain commanding the detached fleet consisting of four gunboats and torpedo flotilla reports by wireless telegraphy that the fleet reached Kinchow Bay and co-operating with our army bombarded Nanshan on 26/5 and upon witnessing our army occupy Nanshan forts withdrew. The Captain of the Chokai was killed besides nine other casualties. The damage to ships is insignificant. (PRO 30/33 – 9/22)

Further detail of attack on Kinchow.
The attack on the enemy at Nanshan commenced 2.35 early morning. The enemy’s defensive works were of nearly permanent nature and the artillery consisted of fifty guns of various calibres and of two quick firing field batteries. The infantry were ranged in two or three lines or covered trenches with loopholes. The enemy also set machine guns at important points and offered stubborn resistance. We ranged all our field guns upon forts. The enemy’s principal artillery were silenced at II, while quickfireres have
previously retired to Nankwanling and fired till night. Our artillery concentrated the fire upon the enemy’s trenches and our infantry advanced within 400 to 500 metres of the enemy. But wire entanglements, mines and trenches laid before us and the enemy’s infantry fire and machine guns remained unabated. We further approached within 200 metres of the enemy and several charges still proved unsuccessful, officers and men all falling at 20 or 30 metres of the enemy, whereupon our artillery made preparatory firing, and in the evening with severest cannonading the last charge was made and with great difficulty opened the breach through which we gained the whole height, expelled the enemy, and captured all the guns on the forts. The fortune incident in this attack was the discovery of the mine wire at the eastern foot of Nanshan which we cut and thus explosion was
prevented. (PRO 30/33 – 9/22)

My Dear Satow
. . .I still think the Japanese will gain the advantage at sea, but I am inclined to question the policy of leaving the Russians a free hand in China waters for so long; perhaps the Japs know best, they generally prove right in the end . . . I have written to our people in Tokio about the French neutrality question. I do not believe that France has done much wrong, if any according to his ideas of the laws of neutrals: it would have been a totally difference matter if the Jap fleet had been outside, or in the vicinity, in that case the ports could not have been used as a ‘base of operations’. There being no enemy near the anchorages [?] have only been used in places of rest, and apparently this is not against French ideas. It is another case of Russia taking mean advantages, she is always at it, and the Japs have been most
upright and straight throughout.
Yours sincerely
Noel (Miri Bay, May 17th 1905) (PRO 30/33-9/23)

My dear Colleague
The death of your great Queen is not England’s loss alone the world has lost the greatest sovereign, and sincerest grief will be experienced throughout Christendom; but nowhere outside of Her Majesty’s domain will her death be more felt, or more hearts be deeply touched than in the United States.
I cannot therefore content myself with only a formal call of sympathy but I beg you to accept the most hearty expression of condolence for all of your people and for yourself my deepest and tenderest personal sympathy.
Believe me, dear colleague.
Yours very sincerely
E. H. Conger (Pekin, China, January 2, 1901) (PRO 30/33-10/1)

My Dear Colleague
Why do you strike at me this way from an ambush? Had you mentioned General C. Creagh’s letter to me I would have tried to convince you that your General was acting under a misapprehension when in his letter he went for General von Lessel who had never dreamed of addressing the diplomatic corps in that matter. What General Creagh tries to establish - a Conference of Generals acting as a unity vis-à-vis of the diplomatic corps - is exactly what we diplomats have always tried to avoid. I have on the contrary always insisted on the closest possible relations between our General and myself and I would have blamed General von Lessel, had he not given me his views on the subject, no matter if they were shared by the other Generals or not.
As your man struck at mine, I naturally have to hit back, but I send my answer first to you in case you might prefer to stop the circular, a proceeding which would meet with my cordial approval. In this case an extract of General Creagh’s two letters, the personal attacks on General von Lessel left out, could be ? to the colleagues, if necessary. If however you are of the opinion that General C. Creagh’s letter must be circulated, then my answer will of course have to be annexed.
Believe me, dear Sir Ernest
Yours very sincerely
?
P.S. In the Jardine Matthiesen affair I am quite willing to meet their wishes, only I would like to see Mr Tower first to talk it over. (Peking, August 22nd 1901) (PRO 30/33 10-1)

Précis
China finds it necessary to reorganise the industries and natural resources of Manchuria and for this purpose requires the cooperation of a company with large resources, such as the Russo Chinese Bank, the capital of which is partly Chinese and partly Russian. Railway and mining enterprises undertaken by the Chinese government or by Chinese subjects and companies using their own capital shall be notified to the Russo Chinese Bank which will finance them. Should China be unable to undertake any such enterprise the Russo-Chinese Bank shall have the first offer.
The agreement is not to interfere with the commerce of the open government or the Commercial and Industrial interests protected by Treaties.
Satow (14.02.02) (PRO 30/33-10/1)

REEL 100
My Dear Mr Jamieson
Since writing to you from here, I have been down the Kai Hsien river and met Mahon.
He reports most favourably on the whole route from Ichang to Kai Hsien River. The route I followed via Kai Hsien, Liang Snan Chang-Shan will give us a still easier route to carry on the continuation to Chungking. I am now going to Cheng-tu. Mahon will carry his route along to Chungking via the north bank of the Yangtze from Wan Hsien. We will then go into summer quarters for a month and in end of August and when the weather permits of our undertaking further work in the field he will come up by my route to Kai Hsien from Chungking. We will then have every opportunity of picking out the most available of the two routes. The route via Liang Snan going as it does along a most rich valley which is full of good coal and has no water communication along it will in addition to its favourable line of levels prove I feel sure the most advantageous. This however is mere matter of detail.
We have now carried out our quest to a successful termination. I would be glad if you would send the following cablegram to “Sindacato London” “Manifold wires” “Complete Success. East direct” “alignment found” “Defer action on fifteenth May” “Proposals until June reports arrive”.
You can probably cut this shorter by your code. I should like them to have this news in London this month as it will be a good thing for them to have something to go on whilst London is still full of people in authority, and whom they can sound as to their future operations.
By the end of July every one is thinking of clearing out and too busy to devote time to China. Before I met Mahon, I had in a letter dated 15th of May recommended that this partly should continue on working until October and that the Government should be asked to give the services of more officers to carry on the survey.
Mahon however assures me that there is nothing to be done further in the way of preliminary reconnaissance that we shall not have finished by October, and then there will be nothing between that and the complete and final survey in detail which will be a big and expensive matter and will probably require that the companies should be assured of the political and other grounds they stand on. In this case we can soon sing a “Nune linitties” [?].
My idea at present is that we should go into quarter for the hot weather which is more getting unbearable, until the end of August, and thus work back from Chengatu and Chungking respectively filling in details that still have repairs to be done.
I am very glad to be able to give such a good report and it is most satisfactory to us, as it has been no light task to keep these heterogeneous parties together working as we have had to do against time and weather never resting a day pause [?] for a halt and having to keep up communications over a distance of 300 miles of country between the different parties.
I remain. Yours truly
C. C. Marifeld (Kai Hsien, June 3rd 1904) (PRO 30/33-10/7)

REEL 101
Dear Sir Ernest
I see by this afternoon’s Reuter that a meeting of the Chinese Development Coy. at New York ratified the sale of the Hankow-Canton railway to China for 6¾ million Dollars; and, if this is correct, I presume that the transaction may be considered closed, and that the U. S. Government will have no further ground for
interference with the arrangement.
Since the British & Chinese Corporation have now the permission of H. M. Government to enter the field, I should be glad if you could tell me if the offer reported to have been made by H. M. Government of a loan for the purchase price must be considered as still in force, or if the B & C Corporation is at liberty to make an offer for this amount, as well as for the money which will be required for construction. Possibly your answer will depend on the reply you receive from Mr Fraser, and I shall be much obliged if you will be so good as to let me know when I may come and see you again on the subject: since, if Reuter is correct, it seems to me that the B & C Corporation should lose no time in coming to a decision as to the offer they are prepared to make.
Yours very truly
Y. Hillier (Peking, 31st August, 1905) (PRO 30/33-10/8)

REEL 103
Dear Lansdowne
I have not been able to ascertain whether the document purporting to be an agreement between China and Russia regarding Thibet is genuine. If it has been actually signed, it is not an official act of the China Government, but a secret agreement between Fung-lu and the very active agent of the Russo-Chinese Bank. In my private letter of 13 August I compared it to the “Cassini Convention”. A few days ago Sir Robert Hart volunteered the same opinion to me, namely that even if it turned out not to be a regularly signed agreement, it contained facts as to arrangements confidentially stipulated for. The Chinese authority mentioned in my desp. by this boy is a young Chinese, son of an official who suffered in the troubles of 1900, where reports have generally proved quite correct. It seems to me therefore that it behoves us to be on the watch, and especially to take measures for observing what happens at Inga [?] between the Russians and the head Lama there.
Satow (11.09.02) (PRO 30/33-14/13)

To F. A. Campbell
The China association is run by a small knot [?] of men, whose sole idea is to wave the British flag in the faces of other nations and to make good their claim to have the Yangtze valley recognised as the enclusively [sic] British sphere.
I have had a hard tussle against Japanese influence over the trade mark regulations, but believe I have succeeded in securing all the amendments that were of importance. The owners of trademarks are now regretting that they were agitated for registration, as they have now discovered that it has to be paid for. So like Shanghai people. They cry for the moon, believing it to be made of green cheese, and when you have taken an infinity of trouble to secure the object of their desires, they are disappointed to find that it is a mass of volcanic [?] and pebbles.
Satow (11.08.04) (PRO 30/33-14/14)

Dear Lord Lansdowne
Peace having been signed, the Japanese Government will shortly proceed no doubt to discuss with China the retention by them of the Liaotung Peninsula in place of the Russians, and the future of the railway.
A Tientsin newspaper has been talking about the withdraw of the foreign troops from N. China, and stating that all the powers are agreed except Japan . . . In regard to Tibet I have not succeeded in getting the Chinese to accept the draft adhesion agreement, as will be seen from a desp. that goes by this bag. They have had every chance offered to them, and I have tried to “save their face” as much as possible. So now I suppose they will recall T’ang from Calcutta. They had their own way in that matter, and have only themselves to thank for the failure of the negotiation.
Rockhill said to me a day or two ago that he feared M. Roosevelt would be very unpopular in Japan on account of the insistence with which he has urged the conclusion of peace. As Reuter telegraphs represent him to have chiefly exhorted the Emperor Nicholas to make concessions, I suppose one may conclude that he put quite as much pressure on the Emperor of Japan; but the Japanese negotiators are too discreet to let it be known. The mere idea that any power had tried to repeat the intervention of 1895 would have stirred the Japanese people into a fury.
Satow (06.09.05) (PRO 30/33-14/16)

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