FOREIGN OFFICE FILES: UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

Series Two: Vietnam, 1959-1975

Part 2: Laos, 1959-1963

Publisher's Note

The basic sequence of events of the Vietnam war are well known, and the United States' gradual move from moral and financial supporter of the Southern Government, to a position where American troops took on the major role in combating the NLF is well documented. But, what often tends to get forgotten is the regional nature of the conflict and how interlocked the countries of South East Asia were in each others political and military situations. This series aims to remedy that situation by providing British Foreign Office files, not only for Vietnam, but also for the neighbouring South East Asian countries that became caught up in the conflict, Cambodia, Laos and Thailand; as well as all relevant SEATO and South East Asia general files for the period 1959-1975.

In the first years of John F Kennedy's Presidency, few people saw Vietnam as the source of any major international crisis. Instead, it was Laos that seemed the mostly likely scene of superpower conflict and regional unrest. Since the French had relinquished control of the country in 1954 an uneasy peace had settled on Laos. The Royal Laotian Government, headed by King Sisavang Vong and his Prime Minister Souvanna Phouma, was in control of most of the country, but left wing forces, the Pathet Lao, who had withdrawn to two northern provinces under the Geneva Agreement, were still armed and always a potential threat.

By the beginning of 1958 an agreement had been reached between Souvanna Phouma and his half brother Souphanouvong, the Pathet Lao leader, to bring the communists into a coalition government and to integrate their soldiers into the regular Royal Laotian Army. Elections held in May 1958 confirmed the popularity of this decision, with parties allied to the Pathet Lao doing particularly well. Right wing elements within the National Assembly, however, who opposed this compromise sought to destabilise the delicate balance that had been achieved. When the USA, worried by the inclusion of Pathet Lao in the government , cut all aid to Laos in June, the rightists took the opportunity of forcing a confidence vote in the administration, engineering a cabinet crisis which prompted Phouma's resignation in August 1958 and plunging the country into turmoil. A new right wing administration was formed by Phoumi Sananikone which granted itself special executive powers, excluded the Pathet Lao from government and arrested it leaders.

By the summer of 1959 full scale conflict had resumed in the northern territories between the Pathet Lao forces who had rejected integration in the Royal Laotian Army and government troops. Reports were also coming in of Vietminh forces making incursions over the border from Vietnam into Sam Neua province. Political events came to a head in December, when the king accepted the resignation of the Phoui administration, following the withdrawal of many of his ministers and an attempted coup by the Army. In January 1960 a provisional government was formed under Kou Abhay to hold power until the situation could be stabilised.

Elections in April 1960, which were widely believed to be rigged, brought Tiami Somsanith to power with General Phoumi Nosavan in the Post of Minister of Defence. The new administration took an equally hard line approach to the Pathet Lao as its predecessor, and armed conflict continued to plague the country. Alarmed by this escalating state of civil war, a 26 year old army officer, Captain Kong Le, staged a successful coup against the government in August 1960. Having gained control of the capital Vientiane, in an operation described by the British military Attaché as "militarily most impressive", the coup leaders persuaded the King to nominate Souvanna Phouma as Prime Minister.

General Phoumi and many members of the Somsanith administration who had not been in Vientiane at the time of the coup, condemned Kong Le's actions and with US backing, announced the establishment of a Counter Coup Committee, branding Kong Le and Phouma 'communists'. These accusations of communist tendencies were strongly denied by Phouma, who reiterated his neutralist credentials arguing that it would not be possible to defeat the Pathet Lao by military means, making it "necessary to bring civil war to an end and fight subversion by political and other means" [FO 371/152346].

However, notwithstanding Phouma's appeal for political dialogue, Kong Le's coup, rather than stabilising the situation, merely prompted further armed conflict. Despite a brief period of reconciliation in which a coalition government was formed between Phouma and Phoumi, mutual suspicions soon rent the new administration, prompting the withdrawal of Phoumi to Savannakhet. From there in September Phoumi and Prince Boun Oum announced the establishment of a Revolutionary Committee which would be assuming power. Within weeks armed conflict had broken out between forces loyal to the Phouma Government and those under the command of General Phoumi. The situation was further complicated by the support of the Pathet Lao, and their Vietnamese and Chinese backers, for Phouma and Kong Le. During October, Phouma held direct talks with the Pathet Lao, in an attempt to bring them into the mainstream of government.

By November, Phoumi, with assurances of American backing, had secured the support of enough Royal Laotian Army commanders to launch an attack against the Phouma government. He also managed to persuade the King, on 14 December, to announce the dismissal of the Phouma administration, and the establishment of a new government headed by Boun Oum. Within days of the King's proclamation, Phoumi managed to recapture Vientiane, forcing Kong Le to retreat into the mountainous countryside to the North of the city, and prompting Phouma to flee to Cambodia. Following the downturn in the military fortunes of the neutralists Phouma turned in desperation to the Soviet Union for aid. In return for Soviet military assistance to Kong Le, he agreed to form a common front with the Pathet Lao in fighting Phoumi. Accordingly, Kong Le launched an offensive late in December 1960, driving forces loyal to Phoumi out of the Plain of Jars, and linking up with the Pathet Lao fighters. By the beginning of January 1961 Kong Le had aso managed to capture the town of Xieng Khouang, strategically located between the administrative capitol Vientiane, and the seat of royal power at Louangphrabang. Over the next few weeks the Soviets airlifted large quantities of military supplies to the anti-Phoumi forces who, aided by units from North Vietnam, took over control of much of northern Laos. By February, Phouma felt confident enough to set up a provisional government at Xieng Khouang in anticipation of quickly overrunning the rest of the country.

This successful co-operation between the Neutralist and Communist forces naturally caused much concern in the United States government. The new President, John F Kennedy, had been elected on a ticket that had stressed the need to halt communist expansion and this combined with an instinctive mistrust of Phouma, prompted US action. In April 1961, following an appeal by the Boun Oum government, the United States established a Military Asistance Advisory Group (MAAG) in Laos with the aim of providing help to General Phoumi in his faltering battle against his Neutralist and Communist opponents.

By March 1961, Kong Le and his Pathet Lao allies forces were making such gains, that General Phoumi was persuaded to arrange a meeting with Souvanna Phouma in Phnom Penh to discuss peace proposals. On 3rd May, following an appeal by the Co-Chairmen of the Geneva Conference and after drawn-out negotiations, General Phoumi and his Prime Minister, Prince Boun Oum, agreed to implement a cease-fire with Souvanna Phouma and the Pathet Lao. This truce was underlined by an agreement between Kennedy and Khrushchev that a neutral coalition government would be the best solution in Laos, a country of little strategic interest to either superpower.

During the second half of 1961 and the beginning of 1962 protracted negotiations were undertaken by the various factions to work out the details of the cease fire and the intricacies of power sharing. A formal cease fire was declared in May 1961 to be overseen by an International Control Commission (ICC), and the following month, Phouma, Boun Oum and Souphannouvog met at Zurich where they agreed in principle to the formation of a coalition government of 'National Union'.

Once a cease-fire had been put into effect, a year's worth of torturous negotiations ensued. The US put increasing pressure on Phoumi and Boun Oum to compromise with Souvanna Phouma, threatening to suspend all American aid unless they participated in the Geneva Conference. Finally a provisional Government of National Union was established in June 1962 under the premiership of Souvanna Phouma. Souphanouvong, the Pathet Lao leader, and the former Prime Minister Boun Oum were both made deputy prime ministers. On July 23, representatives of all the major parties met at the Geneva Conference and signed the Geneva Protocol, guaranteeing the neutrality of Laos. Recognising its obligations under this agreement, the US began the withdrawal from Laos of its military advisors, who had been assisting Phoumi.

By the summer of 1962, the future of Laos seemed to have been secured, with all the main factions now incorporated into the government. In the words of the British Ambassador, although "progress in applying the Agreements in Laos" were "disappointingly slow", a general peace had been "more or less maintained" [FO 371/169802]. Inevitably though, suspicions still lingered and many of the factions turned to more covert ways of continuing the struggle for dominance. US sources claimed that large numbers of North Vietnamese troops were still positioned in the northern provinces, whilst leftists countered with accusations that the CIA was arming and training Hmong tribesmen. Trouble was also brewing amongst former allies, as Colonel Deuane Sunnalath an army commander loyal to the Neutralist cause, defected with his troops to the Pathet Lao following a quarrel with Kong Le. This argument came to a head in the spring of 1963 as fighting broke out between forces who had followed the dissident Colonel Deuane (who now styled themselves "Left Wing Neutralists") and those who remained loyal to Kong Le. Seeing his military position deteriorate, Kong Le decided that his best option was to come to terms with his former enemy Phoumi, and by association, his US backers. Simultaneously, a terror campaign waged against the Pathet Lao and its sympathisers in Vientiane, culminating in the assassination of Foreign Minister Quinim in April 1963, prompted the evacuation of that city by Souphannouvong and his allies, who returned to their northern strong hold, effectively ending the coalition Provisional Government of National Union.

By the beginning of 1964, the situation in Laos had returned to one of armed conflict. The US began supplying military aid to Kong Le in his fight against his former allies, whilst the North Vietnamese increased their assistance to the Pathet Lao. The scene was now set for a resumption of full civil war with a high potential for outside interference and regional destabilisation.

This microfilm collection provides all the British Foreign Office files from its 'backbone' class (FO 371) for Laos for the years 1959 to 1963. Charting in great detail events in Laos, the documents in this publication will prove invaluable to anyone wishing to fully come to terms with political and military affairs during this turbulent and chaotic period of the country's history. Compiled by highly trained members of the Foreign Office and associated bodies, key files included cover:

• Annual reviews for Laos for the years 1958, 1959, 1960, 1961 and 1962
• The internal political situation in Laos
• The political relations between Laos and other countries including China, USSR, France, Vietnam, UK and USA.
• The International Control Commission (ICC) in Laos
• Training of the Laotian military
• SEATO's contingency planning for Laos
• The Geneva Conference on Laos (of which Britain was Co-Chairman) and negotiations for a cease fire
• The status of foreign troops in Laos
• Aid to Laos from the United Kingdom, United States and France

The following extract of a letter from the British Embassy in Vientiane to the Foreign Office in London (FO 371/159871) gives a good flavour of the candid type of documents to be found within this collection:

September 1961

"In papragraph five of your letter of August 24 you said you would like to know if the Americans seem to be embarking on policies in Laos which run counter to the sense of the Paris meetings…
In discussion on the armed forces question the American Military Attaché has admitted more than once that he does not believe that integration will work and that an object of his recommendations is to give General Phoumi and the US the strongest possible position.

I am informed that MAAG officers constantly encourage General Phoumi to push his troops forward now wherever he can. The spirit of the Paris Peace talks has been slow to filter down to the working level of MAAG. For example the MAAG colonel in charge of training summed up his attitude to my Third Secretary as follows: "There is no need to prove we are good; we know we are good. What we have to do is prove to every villager in Laos that he can have confidence and security under the Vientiane government."
MAAG are trying to implement a civil programme of community development in every centre where there is a MAAG team on the lines of their efforts in Khen Thao, which were described in my Third Secretary's report… This programme is carried out in close co-operation with USIS (within whose organisation a group of MAAG personnel works) in order to ensure that the maximum impact propaganda is derived.
USOM also co-operates but concerns itself very much less with politics than MAAG or USIS. Indeed USOM, of which members of the two other agencies have in the past been critical and even contemptuous, almost invariably judges projects of their value as effective aid and thus exerts a stabilising influence.

Some of USIS propaganda is astute but it is sometimes stupid and counter productive. For example in most of the larger Buddhist temples of Vientiane the authorities have ordered the showing of propaganda films, sometimes as often as three times a week. One of the most frequently shown has been a film entitled "The Liberation of Vientiane" which, ignoring the fact that the Pathet Lao did not commit themselves, proclaims the battle as a simple and decisive victory against communism. To show this film at all in a centre where Konglae had enjoyed great popularity is in itself an error of judgement, especially as almost everyone who sees the film knows that it is not true. This is particularly offensive to public opinion when the film is shown in a Buddhist Temple."

<back