FOREIGN OFFICE FILES FOR JAPAN AND THE FAR EAST
Series Two: British Foreign Office Files for Post-War Japan, 1952-1980
(Public Record Office Classes FO 371 and FCO 21)

Part 9: Complete Files for 1975-1977

Publisher's Note

This sequence of complete files has a strong emphasis on Japanese politics, economic, trade and financial policy, social issues and foreign policy.  International relations between Japan and the United States, China, Taiwan, the Soviet Union, Britain and Europe are well covered. Reports, memoranda and regular communications between the Foreign Office and the British Embassy and Consulates in Japan examine the most important issues of the period 1975-1977.

By the end of 1974 Japan had dealt successfully with many of her most difficult economic and political problems in the wake of the Oil Crisis and restored a favourable balance of payments. Nevertheless, the era of 10 per cent annual growth was definitely at an end. Miki Takeo took over as Prime Minister from Tanaka Kakuei on 9 December 1974 and attempted to reform the Liberal Democratic Party and facilitate the investigation of the Lockheed bribery scandals. This made him very unpopular within his own party and the Lockheed case did not help the LDP’s electoral fortunes. It lost its overall majority in the 1976 Diet elections and thereafter had to rely upon the support of minor parties. Miki resigned on 24 December 1976 and was replaced by Fukuda Takeo. He endeavoured to tackle the problem of factions within the LDP.

The files provide significant material on the following topics:

Politics

In trying to find a new leader and Prime Minster, the LDP was at first deadlocked by the evenly matched rivalry between Ohira, who had stayed loyal to Tanaka and remained in the Government, and Fukuda, who had resigned and done his best to bring his old rival down. Vice-President Shiina was brought in as a neutral consensus-taker and after intense consultations a consensus candidate eventually emerged. Miki, an experienced politician and former Foreign Minister led a smallish faction on the Left wing of the party. Initially he had seemed too far from the main stream for the top job, but in the end all elements of the LDP supported the decision to appoint Miki.

Fred Warner, the British Ambassador in Tokyo, suggests in his Annual Review of 1974 (see FCO 21/1423) that:

“One strong argument for Miki was that his financial reputation is clean.  He thus has a reasonable chance of improving the LDP’s image; he may also to some extent pull the nation together.  He was chosen as a caretaker leader but that is not his own view of his role.  So long as Fukuda and Ohira fail to reach agreement and so long as the party does not suffer any major reverses in the spring local elections, he may be able to hang on in power for a year or even more.  His policy is one of national reconciliation, of continuing to fight inflation, but of tempering the severity of that fight by increased public expenditure and extension of the social services.  His Left of Centre stance in the party corresponds with the mood of the majority of the nation.” 

In foreign policy Miki had already established good credentials from his time as Foreign Minister. Fred Warner reports that he “has advocated closer relations with China and has established good relations with the Arabs.”

A letter from S J Gomersall, at the British Embassy, Tokyo, to A R Brenton, in London, dated 30 December 1975, sums up the situation a year later and comments on the Extraordinary Diet Session:  September – December 1975 (see FCO 21/1422):

“The Extraordinary Diet Session ended on 25 December after a span of 106 days, the longest extraordinary session on record.  Despite its length, the session produced no more than the minimum that was expected of it.  The tobacco, liquor, and postal price rise bills which were first submitted in January of this year were finally passed, as also was a supplementary budget and a bill to enable the Government to issue deficit financing bonds to the value of Yen 2.3 trillion.

Compared to the expectations of Government-Opposition dialogue aroused by Mr Miki at the beginning of the year, the Extraordinary Session saw a reversion of the Government under pressure to the use of its majority to force its bills unamended through the committees.  This was doubtless influenced by the difficulty of passing bills through the Upper House committees where the LDP has a very small majority…”

Chairman Takeiri of the Central Executive Committee to the 13th National Convention of Komeito, the third largest of the Opposition parties in Japan, protested in strong terms on 14 October 1975 (see FCO 21/1422):

“So far the Miki Cabinet has succeeded in hiding its anti-people character, which is its true character, buy means of its cunning political trickery and the feint of dialogue and reconciliation.  In the current extraordinary session of the Diet, however, it re-introduced the controversial bills to raise the prices of liquor, tobacco and postal charges, betraying the expectations of the people who are suffering from high prices and a depression, and the ruling Liberal-Democratic Party resorted twice to the tactics of forcing decision on the bills single-handedly, bluntly revealing its posture of trampling down democracy and ignoring the voice of the people…

In order to protect the livelihood of those engaged in small business and the working masses, we will buckle down to having the big business oriented recession measures changed into measures giving precedence to the welfare of the people.  At the same time, we will hotly pursue the Miki Cabinet for a large number of its maladministration cases, and ferret out to the hilt its corruptive character, so as to bare its dangerous character to the eyes of the people.”

On 4 June 1976, Michael Wilford, the new British Ambassador in Tokyo, was moved to write a piece to the Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs in London entitled: “Japanese Politics in a Quagmire” (see FCO 21/1511). His main points were as follows:

“The Liberal Democratic Party, which has ruled Japan for 20 years, faces two major elections and is in need of reform.  Its grip on management of the Diet has slipped, and recent events, including those arising from the Lockheed scandal, have revealed a bankruptcy of ideals and policies.  Demographic forces have also influenced its decline.

Mr Miki, the Prime Minister, is an outsider in his party, and rival faction leaders of a more conservative mould are seeking to jettison him.  However, the Opposition Parties, having failed to take advantage of LDP disarray, remain as divided as ever.  Japanese politics for the time being lack a strong central force and are going through a murky phase. The role of the Press in recent events has been a positive one.

Mr Miki will probably be forced to step down.  The election results are unlikely to hold much cheer for any party, but will have an important bearing on next year’s Upper House election and subsequent political alignments.”

In the same file, (FCO 21/1511), a 4 page report on ‘Japanese Politics’ by J E Hoare, Far Eastern Section Research Department, dated 16 September 1976, provides an extremely useful and lucid summary of the whole background to the political struggle in Japan during this period.

It portrays Miki as hanging on to power with behind the scenes attempts to oust him from the leadership of the LDP against a backdrop of the difficulties of the Lockheed affair.

FCO 21/1512 includes Miki’s letter to the Rt Hon Anthony Crosland, Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs, on the eve of Miki’s resignation. He writes:

"It had been my belief that should my Liberal Democratic Party suffer a substantial loss in the General Election of December 5th I would assume the responsibility in a statesman-like manner.  As it turned out, the results of the election were not in favour of my Party and accordingly I have decided to resign.

In spite of this outcome of the election, Japan’s political stability based on conservative strength, I believe, has not been affected, as a considerable number of candidates belonging to the New Liberal Club and of independents with LDP affiliation have been returned.

Moreover, Mr Takeo Fukuda who for a long time has served as my Deputy Prime Minister is expected to succeed me and I feel certain that the Liberal Democratic Party will continue to remain in power in the future.

Looking back upon the results of the recent election, I wish to mention two salient points.  First, regarding the so-called Lockheed scandal the Liberal Democratic Party bore the brunt of severe criticism, particularly for the alleged involvement of a former Prime Minister.  Secondly, however, the middle-of-the-road posture which I have long been pursuing, namely to avoid confrontation and seek dialogue and co-operation, did indeed receive firm support from the Japanese people.”

FCO 21/1564 includes a report by S J Gomersall on ‘Japanese Internal Politics’ dealing with the Budget and the LDP factions, dated 11 March 1977.  On the Budget he reports:

“Previously the Government has never been in the position of having to agree to an amendment of its Budget against its better judgement.  That it was obliged to compromise this time was due mainly to the changed balance of forces since the election, and to the participation of the New Liberal Club in the opposition front.  The Government originally intended to stand firm in the expectation that the opposition would be divided…

The Budget Bill is now likely to clear the Lower House Committee on 17 March, before Mr Fukuda goes to Washington for his meetings with President Carter (19-25 March).  However this visit, though not in question, is causing trouble in the Upper House since the Prime Minister’s presence is deemed indispensable in the interpellations which form the first stage of the Upper House’s deliberations on the Budget.  The Upper House may therefore not begin its 30 days debate on the Budget before
Mr Fukuda’s return, thus delaying its passage by an extra week, until probably the third or fourth week of April.”

On the LDP factions Gomersall notes:  “The Fukuda faction disbanded on 9 March, and the Ohira faction on 10 March.  The Tanaka faction is reported to be preparing to disband on 16 March.   The formal dissolution of the three major factions goes some way towards meeting Mr Fukuda’s campaign promise, and reflects the fairly close unity of the three mainstream factions which supported Fukuda’s bid for power.  It is fairly widely believed that Mr Fukuda has virtually promised the succession to Mr Ohira within a couple of years, with the tacit support of the Tanaka faction – though of course there are many things that could upset this scenario.

It is not easy to assess at this stage what the effect of these moves will be.  The Nakasone and Miki factions are standing their ground, though the former is reported to be thinking of dissolving his faction and reconstituting it as a study group.  The factions in the LDP began to be formed in the late 1950s and have ever since served as the mechanism for procurement of power and financial support.  They have also had a positive role as clubs for political discussion, and in providing some form of checks and balances inside the party power structure.  Only in the last five years have they really become the focus of criticism for their financial excesses and their division of political spoils.  Outwardly therefore the LDP has taken the first important step towards modernisation, but has taken the first important step towards modernisation, but whether the electorate will appreciate this remains to be seen.”

The important policy speeches in the 80th session of the National Diet of Prime Minister Fukuda and the Foreign Minister, Iichiro Hatoyama, are covered in FCO 21/1564. Details on the latter’s visit to the UK in November 1977 are in FCO 21/1576.

Economic situation

FCO 21/1432 is a detailed file on the “Economy of Japan”. It includes a 15 page report entitled“The Japanese Economy and the Problems posed by the Arab Countries:  An Economists’ View” and a
19 page report with 24 pages of Appendices with statistics on “The Japanese Economy after the Outbreak of the Oil Crisis”, April 1975, compiled by Dr Toshihiko Yoshino, Executive Vice President and Director General of the Yamaichi Research Institute of Securities and Economics.

“…the Japanese economy has overcome the short-term chaotic situation stemming from the oil crisis, and is gradually regaining its stability.  This, however, does not mean that I hold an easy-going and optimistic outlook for the future of the Japanese economy, because a large number of unsolved problems are still remaining…”  He identifies 3 areas:

1.  Wholesale prices/ consumer prices/ wage costs
2.  Uncertainty over the future of Japan’s exports
3.  Need to economise in the consumption of oil

Other items include:

• A note by J I McGhie on “Direction for Japan’s Industrial Structure”, 20 March 1975, from the British Embassy Tokyo to the Department of Trade in London, followed by comments and analysis by E J Field
• Notes and papers on “Japan’s Balance of Payments”
• An 8 page report on  “Economic Policy Making in Japan” by R E G Burges Watson,                13 February 1975, pulling together some of the main themes of interest to the Embassy which emerged from the talks between Sir Douglas Wass and top Japanese Civil Servants, bankers and businessmen.  “My dominant impression is that the relationship is still a close and successful one.  Many changes are taking place in the Japanese scene.  However, although the consensus which has prevailed for the last 15 years or so may now be weakening, there is a strong band of confidence between Government and business in Japan, and the 2 sides will do their best to adapt to each other.”
• Japanese Economic Forecasts
• The Japanese Budget for 1975
• A report by J E W Kirby, Financial Attaché, British Embassy, Tokyo with details of his visit to Nagoya, Osaka and Kobe, 27-30 January 1975, and his notes on meetings with 4 companies: Toyota, MHI Kobe Shipyard and Engine Works (Mitsubishi Heavy Industries), Matsushita Electric and Toyobo (textile producers).

FCO 21/1434 deals with the following topics:

• Japan’s economic prospects
• Japan’s trade with the European Community
• Housing
• Bank of Japan
• The “Right to Strike” – public sector strikes, November – December 1975
• Miyazaki, Head of the Research Bureau of the Economic Planning Agency
• Economic development in the Sentonaikai region – reports on visits to various companies
• Government Budgets
• Liquor Tax
• Internationalisation of the Yen
• The Japanese Long Term Energy Supply – Demand Programme
• Business and Government in Japan. 
• UK Exports to Japan
• Industrial Structure
• Unemployment Statistics
• “Japan in 1985” or “Japan’s Economic Prospects” – an article by E J Field, First Secretary (Commercial), British Embassy, Tokyo (looking ahead 10 years)
• Debate on Sir Fred Warner’s dispatch of 22 May, which examined the prospects for Japan’s economy in the next 10 years and the consequences these might have for Japan’s trading partners

The Annual Review for 1975 (see FCO 21/1513) states in its summary:

“In 1975 the economic depression deepened, seriously affecting business, and the expected recovery proved elusive.  As a result the Japanese no longer expect to go back to high growth as they knew it.  With changed attitudes, they will be content with 5-6 per cent, at least for the time being.”

Later in the Review, Michael Wilford writes:

“…although Japan’s deepest post-war recession bottomed out in the early spring, recovery has been slow and hesitant.  Official stimulatory measures have been a series of four reflationary packages with associated cuts in the discount rate.  Consumer price rises have been brought down to about 10 per cent per annum but real GNP is only up on last year (itself a year of negative growth) by a modest 2 per cent or so.  The fourth and last package was undoubtedly originally intended as a measure to get recovery under way in time to produce a buoyant atmosphere for an election next spring, but the further oil price hike in October and the fact that the Government is now so weak in the Upper House of the Diet means that the whole programme has been set back by about 2 months.”

FCO 21/1577-1579 cover Japan and the Economic Summit Meeting of May 1977 in Downing Street, London. The next cluster of files, FCO 21/1579-1582, take a detailed look at the development of Anglo-Japanese Trade Relations in 1977.

Lockheed affair

J E Hoare in his 4 page report on ‘Japanese Politics’, dated 16 September 1976, (see FCO 21/1511) provides an explanation of the beginnings of the Lockheed affair:

“At the beginning of February 1976, the US Senate Sub Committee on multi-national corporations received testimony from the former Vice-Chairman of the Lockheed Aircraft Corporation, Mr Kotchian.  Kotchian claimed that money had been paid, on the advice of the Marubeni Corporation (Japan’s third largest trading company), to Yoshio Kodama, directors of Marubeni and two other recipients with Japanese connections.  This money had been paid with a view to selling Lockheed aircraft in Japan.  Kodama was a well-known right-winger, with links to the ruling LDP, and Kotchian claimed that the money had been intended for “senior government officials” in Japan.”

This was the beginning of a considerable furore in Japanese political life.  From the beginning, Miki pledged that he would allow all investigations to be pursued to the end.  This was welcomed by all the Japanese opposition parties.  All the Japanese political parties sent investigation teams to the United States in February, but were unable to uncover anything.  Both Houses of the Diet passed unanimous resolutions on the 23 February calling for the release of all relevant material to the Japanese Diet, and Mr Miki wrote on a personal basis to President Ford the following day to reiterate the Diet’s request.  However, when the Japanese and the American governments reached an agreement for the confidential transfer of the relevant papers to Japan in March, the opposition parties protested that this did not implement the Diet’s resolutions of 23 February.  They then withdrew from the Diet, refusing to participate until the evidence was submitted directly to the Diet.  In the meantime, police investigations had led to the indictment of Kodama on 13 March for tax evasion.

The opposition parties boycotted the Diet from 8 March to 22 April.  Government business came to a virtual halt, but the LDP was able to pass a provisional budget with the assistance of the small right-of-centre Democratic Socialist Party.  Eventually, a compromise was patched up, whereby in return for rather vague undertakings by the government to continue its investigations of the Lockheed scandal, the opposition parties would return to the Diet.  When the Diet did reconvene, the LDP was able to pass its 1976-77 budget, obtain ratification of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, plus a number of minor bills, but much of Mr Miki’s legislative programme did not pass.  In an unusual departure from precedent, Mr Miki also failed to have the Diet session extended to pass legislation left over from the ordinary session.  By that stage (late May), the LDP was engaging in considerable infighting as the more powerful faction leaders tried to oust Miki and end the Lockheed investigation.  Continued press and other speculation was increasing linking Kodama’s name with members of the LDP, including Tanaka.

June saw the arrests of those directly involved in the Lockheed affair, with important officials of All Nippon Airways (Japan’s domestic airline) and the Marubeni Corporation, being indicted.  It also saw the defection from the LDP of 6 comparatively younger Diet men who announced they were leaving the Party because it could not reform itself.  They called themselves the “new liberal” – Shinjiyu – club.  This evidence of the LDP’s growing difficulties plus Mr Miki’s undoubted popularity with the public because of his insistence on a full Lockheed investigation, appears to have helped him fight off the challenge to his leadership from within the Party.  The public differences between Miki and the Party Vice President Shiina, the representative of the anti-Miki groups, were formally patched up at a meeting on 20 June.

The agreement did not in fact stop behind the scenes attempts to oust Miki from continuing.  Then on 27 July, Tanaka, the former Prime Minister, was arrested for having violated exchange control legislation.  Miki stressed that this even underlined the need for party reform.  While this attitude was praised by some parts of the press, it did not endear Miki to many within his Party.  They felt that the investigations should have stopped short of a former party president and prime minister.  Following Tanaka’s arrest, Miki reiterated a pledge he had made earlier that should any of his major appointees be found to be involved in the Lockheed scandal, he would resign.  This reiteration came at a time when increasing speculation was being aired about Mr Nakasone, the Secretary General of the LDP, and a Miki appointee.  According to this speculation, Nakasone had received money from “questionable sources” when he was International Trade and Industry Minister.

The remainder of the summer has seen the Lockheed investigations continue, and the political infighting in the LDP intensify.  Further arrests in August included a former Transport Minister, Mr Hashimoto, and a former Vice Minister of Transport, Mr Sato. ”

An entire file, FCO 21/1521, is devoted to the scandal, but many other files contain a great deal of information on these developments.

FCO 21/1511 includes a report by Simon Grove, Tokyo Liaison Office of Grieveson, Grant & Co Investment Research on ‘The Political Situation in Japan, August 1976’ covering topics such as corruption and faction, the emergence of Miki, shifts in the political spectrum, the political outlook for 1977, and the prognosis for business and the stock market in Japan. It suggests that: “The Lockheed affair has been imperfectly reported in London, and much of the background to it is little understood outside Japan.” On ‘Corruption and Faction’ he writes:

“‘Japanese corruption’, if we may use such a term, tends to differ from venality elsewhere in Asia and the West in that it is less personally directed and more centred on the group.  This is in conformity with the structure of Japanese society.  Power and money being indivisible (at least in Japan) the senior member of a group tends to receive gifts or support on behalf of his followers, amongst whom much of the largesse is redistributed.  At lower levels, too, the funds thus secured are more likely to be spent on securing a power-base or on maintaining prestige than on personal aggrandisement.”

S J Gomersall writing from the British Embassy in Tokyo, 16 December 1976, covers the indictment of Kenji Osano and suggests that “the undisclosed “Osano” and “Kodama” routes are potentially the hottest particularly because the trails, if partly uncovered, could subsequently be found to lead in all sorts of directions.” (see FCO 21/1521):

“Shortly after the election, on 8 December, the Tokyo Regional Prosecutors ordered a search at the residence of Kenji Osano, President of Kokusai Kogyo, to establish evidence concerning his receipt of money from Lockheed.  Since Osano’s testimony in the Diet in which he denied any such receipts (our previous correspondence refers), the prosecutors claim to have established, from Lockheed sources, that Osano himself picked up 200,000 dollars in cash at Los Angeles airport, and that this was covered by a receipt issued by Yoshio Kodama, Lockheed’s undeclared agent in Japan.  They therefore decided last September to indict him for perjury in the Diet.  The prosecutors are thought to believe that this money at least never went beyond Osano, but because of the latter’s illness have been unable to question him at length on his receipts and disposal of Lockheed funds.  This search may be significant as an indication that the prosecutors intend to carry out Mr Miki’s orders to investigate the case to the end, even after the election…

The Park To Son case and the activities of the KCIA in Washington have also aroused considerable interest here, not least because it is known that certain LDP politicians (some of whom are now retired) have been receiving money from South Korea for many years.  Any small piece of firm evidence which came out from Washington, even as a sidelight on the American Congressional investigation, could give the newpapers a pretext to publish what they themselves know.  Some of them have recently been conducting their own investigations in anticipation of this eventuality.

It is commonly assumed, as you probably already know, that those most likely to suffer would be Nakasone (through his connections with Kodama) and Fukuda (through his connections with ex Prime Minister Kishi).  Some senior members inside the LDP have recently been hinting that it would be unwise in the light of recent events to select as their leader a man who has the sword of Damocles hanging over his head.  The opposition parties are already preparing to follow up both Lockheed and the Korean connection during the next Diet session.”

C T W Humfrey’s note on ‘Lockheed’ to A R Brunton in the Far Eastern Department, FCO, London, dated 2 September 1976, draws the following conclusions:

“Japanese society is still to a very large degree formed of a complex structure of interlocking relationships.  Each relationship contains its own pattern of reciprocal obligations.  In the business and political worlds these obligations often take the concrete form of presents, entertainments, contributions to political funds and favours.  These are sometimes on a scale which would in Europe amount to corruption but which here are so wide practiced and known and which in the end so balance each other that one cannot really say that in Japanese terms anything improper has taken place.  From time to time this pattern goes rotten; contributions cease to be to political funds but go to individual politicians, the presents and entertainments become excessively lavish and the favours are on a considerable scale.  When things reach this point, even the Japanese agree that it amounts to corruption.  In short, there is a limit beyond which things should not go; I would hate to say exactly where this line is drawn, I am quite clear that it exists.  In the Lockheed context the relationship between business and politicians and officials went well beyond the limit…

One of the more sensitive aspects of the scandal from the point of view of the government-business relationship is the strong possibility that senior officials of the Ministry of Transport may have also received bribes.  This could hurt the image of civil servants.  But the Ministry of Transport can not be compared with the Ministry of Finance of MITI in terms of prestige, nor does it play as central a role.  Consequently the damage is likely to be less than if these two Ministries were involved.  Another aspect is that two of the ANA officials arrested.  Wakasa the President of ANA and Sawa his Managing Director, were formerly Administrative Vice Minister and Director General of the Civil Aviation Bureau respectively of the Ministry of Transport.  They have clearly abused their links with the Ministry and this must reflect on the “ama kudari” system whereby government officials retire to take up senior positions in related industries.

I would think it unlikely that the scandal will have any significant impact on the traditional relations between government and industry.  It would take a very large shift in the composition of the government with the emergence of a radical coalition holding very different attitudes before any real change could be expected…

The scandal has not as far as I am aware produced a noticeable reaction about dealings with foreign firms.  Public anger has been directed at the Japanese involved.  The exception to this is Lockheed itself whose commercial prospects here have clearly been badly affected for the time being.  It is likely, however, that other American and multinational giants engaged in major deals, particularly those involving aircraft, will need to be seen to be above suspicion for some time in any deals they are negotiating.  This applies to our own aircraft sales efforts.”

A note in a report of 11 March 1977 by S J Gomersall on ‘Japanese Internal Politics’ (see FCO 21/1564) mentions:

“The Government also suffered a sharp blow in the special Lockheed Committee when the Minister of Justice was censured for adopting an uncooperative attitude toward the Diet in refusing to provide documents for investigations into the Lockheed affair.  That the opposition’s motion of reprimand passed the committee – the first time such a thing has happened in recent history – was a severe psychological shock for the LDP.”

State visit by the Queen

The Annual Review for 1975 (see FCO 21/1513) gives very positive feedback on the impact of the Queen’s visit to Japan:

“It was indeed a very great success and has left a lasting impact.  Audience ratings on television, for instance, achieved a national all-time high of 70 per cent.  The visit undoubtedly affected favourably, in turn, the arrangements for the visit of His Majesty the Emperor to the US, and has created a new atmosphere for the planned celebration this year of the Emperor’s 50th year of reign…

It was wholly fitting that on the cultural side the British Council and the Japanese authorities rose to the occasion.  All events during the year were to some extent geared to the Royal Visit, in particular the visits of the Royal Ballet and the BBC Symphony Orchestra and an exhibition of a collection of The Queen’s drawings which had the distinction of being shown, quite exceptionally, in the National Museum…

At the same time, more than 63 department stores throughout Japan arranged special displays, with our help, to promote sales of high quality British consumer goods...”

Michael Wilford’s first impressions of Japan

Upon taking up their new post in Tokyo it is always customary for the incoming British Ambassador to send London an account of his first impressions. As with the Valedictory dispatches of outgoing Ambassadors these are usually interesting documents. Michael Wilford, unlike many of his predecessors had never lived in Japan before or spent a great deal of time there. His piece (see FCO 21/1514) offers a vivid description of the country’s capital city including observations on the urban sprawl of Tokyo, traffic and congestion, the parks and open spaces, the culture, children, popular music and the Imperial Family.

“The sheer size of Tokyo is intimidating as is the urban sprawl down the coast.  Tokyo is less polluted and rather better provided with public spaces than expected…”

“I had been prepared by my earlier visits to Japan for the urban sprawl which results in a passable imitation of Sandown Park being sandwiched between warehouses and power stations on the way into Tokyo form Haneda airport.  I had not expected the enormous size of Tokyo in all directions which means that even with the (unfinished) Capital Expressway it still takes 40 minutes of urban crawling to get on to the National Expressways.  Nor had I realised the extent of the ribbon development from Tokyo through Kawasaki to Yokohama and Yokosuka before one reaches an inch of uncluttered seaside.  But all this is repeated extensively along the Inland Sea which we have observed as we travel by the Shinkansen (or Bullet Train) so as to see as much as possible for the country in which we are living.  Yet within an hour or so of Tokyo there is some lovely country and one can see orchards of fruit, tea gardens and fish farms by the sea.  It is moreover the paucity of flat land either for agriculture or for development which causes so much of the ugly sprawl in Japan, though the urgency of rebuilding the shattered cities after the war was no doubt responsible for the patent lack of planning in urban areas…”

“The parks too are something for which I was not prepared.  I had assumed that because of overcrowding play spaces would be virtually non-existent.  They are indeed few in number by the standards of London, but there are many more than I had expected.  In them it always seems to be culture day of some kind – last week it was sketching by groups of children; this week a glee club is practicing; next week flautists and violinists are at work and in the windy weather there are kite flyers innumerable...”

“Japan has yet to feel the full responsibilities of her economic power, but I detect a greater willingness to assume a role not of leadership of the Asian countries, but that of a sort of elder brother.  At Rambouillet Mr Miki felt himself to be the spokesman of the developing Asians.  He therefore made a particular effort afterwards to let them know what had happened and especially the ASEAN Powers.  In this group Japan places great hopes for the future... At home she is slowly but surely emerging from recession which has taught her lessons of which we have long experience.  The shadow of unemployment has fallen on Japan.  Firms have found that there is a limit beyond which they cannot afford to maintain unproductive labour.  Redundancy has entered the Japanese vocabulary.  The record level of savings (which were always high by our standards) suggest that the ordinary man is less sure of lifelong employment than he was.  This will alter traditional thinking, but Japan, like Britain, will remain dependent upon her ability to import raw materials for her factories and to export finished products to pay for her imports.  She will attach special importance to that part of the Rambouillet Declaration which dealt with freedom of trade.”

Japanese Foreign Policy and Trade Relations

Japan’s outlook in this area is encapsulated by the speech of the Foreign Minister, Iichiro Hatoyama, to the Diet on 31 January 1977. Details of this are in FCO 21/1564 and some of the principal points are as follows:

“Friendly and co-operative relations between Japan and the United States, as neighbours across the Pacific, are the cornerstone of our foreign policy.  It is clear also that this co-operative relationship with the United States, including the security arrangements, has played a major role in ensuring the peace and security of Japan and in bringing about our economic prosperity.  The Government intends to continue its close consultations with the new Carter administration not only on bilateral issues but also on entire range of international problems of common interest including those in Asia, and to maintain continual dialogue and firm co-operative relations between our two governments on a global perspective.

Japan and the other advanced democracies enjoy today relations of close and multifarious cop-operation among them and are contributing greatly to the peace and development of the international community.

The Government regards its relations with the nations of Western Europe as of great importance, and intends to strengthen the mutual understanding and broaden the co-operation with these nations on questions including trade problems.

Among Canada, Australia, New Zealand, and ourselves, there is an increasingly strong common awareness of the importance of our mutual co-operation for the stability and development of the Asia-Pacific region.”

Japan had an important role to play at Rambouillet and at other international gatherings of the major powers. Japan came to be regarded as an equal player at the top table of international diplomacy and economic relations. These years featured visits to Japan in 1975 by Peter Shore (Secretary of State for Trade), Anthony Crosland (Secretary of State for the Environment), Anthony Wedgwood Benn (Secretary of State for Energy) and Frederick Peart (Minister of Agriculture). Anglo-Japanese relations received a major boost with the Queen’s State Visit to Japan in 1975 and the reciprocal visit to the UK in 1976 by the Crown Prince and Princess of Japan. Visits to Japan in 1976 by Anthony Crosland (Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs) and Gerald Kaufman (Minister of State for Industry) were followed by the visit to the UK in November 1977 of The Japanese Foreign Minister, Iichiro Hatoyama.

Britain’s main priority was to improve trade relations with Japan. This core thrust of British policy dominates many files and is evident in many different documents.  In his Annual Review for 1976, (see FCO 21/1566), Michael Wilford concluded:

“If trade has been the substance of our relations – and of this Embassy’s work – in the past year I see no cause to regret this. The important thing is that we should continue to put pressure both on our own exporters and on the Japanese to make much faster expansion of our exports to Japan possible.”

Industrial Relations

Prime Minister Fukuda stated in his speech to the Diet on 31 January 1977:

“One essential ingredient of economic and social stability is understanding and co-operation between labour and management. 

Fortunately, Japanese workers and managers have time and again demonstrated a superlative adaptability to economic crises, and this is to be commended.  It is my strong desire that, in the future as well, exhaustive labour-management dialogue will be held and sensible responses made in the light of the actual state of Japan’s economy and in the spirit of co-operation and solidarity.” (See details in FCO 21/1564).

Welfare

Prime Minister Fukuda also turned his attention to welfare issues in his speech to the Diet on 31 January 1977:

“A true welfare society is only possible when it is grounded in a genuine feeling for those in need.  Today, when economic growth can no longer be expected to provide all the answers, paying special and warm consideration to those underprivileged people who are truly in need of welfare has become all the more important.  It is my intention, in line with the spirit of social solidarity, to help welfare policies steadily move forward.

For the elderly, in step with the trend of rapid increase in the average age of the population, we shall strive to make pension and medical care systems more complete; and for people who are mentally or physical handicapped or socially underprivileged we shall, in addition to devising minutely thought-out measures, join forces with families, communities, and businesses to enhance the chances for rehabilitation and social participation of these people so that their lives become more worth living.” (See details in FCO 21/1564).

Housing

Prime Minister Fukuda stated in his speech to the Diet on 31 January 1977:

“Improvement of housing conditions, which has lagged behind somewhat in the course of rapid economic growth, must be actively expedited, as it is fundamental to national life.

While housing should, of course, increase quantitatively, I believe that, from now on, the aim should be for its qualitative improvement, and that we would strive to improve housing-loan provisions and to increase the availability of public housing.  I want, furthermore, to tackle more earnestly the difficulties that stand in the way of holding down land prices and increasing the land available for housing.”

(See details in FCO 21/1564).

Environment

Pollution and environmental problems received increasing political attention during this period. Fukuda noted in his speech to the Diet on 31 January 1977 that:

“Pollution, destruction of nature, and other environmental problems have become rapidly intensified during the period of high growth.  While it is not possible to maintain a viable society in the absence of sound industrial activity, I am convinced that common ground can be found among the varying interests in society by a rational and dispassionate adjustment of the intertwining conflicts among them.”

He promised:

“In view of this, I shall in addition to improving and strengthening pollution prevention measures, strive to make sure that no environmental pollution is engendered from developments and to promote measures for water supply, flood control and disaster prevention in order to preserve fertile land and to secure a pleasant environment for human beings.” (Again, please see details in FCO 21/1564).

Status of Women

In Japan there continued to be gradual change in this area. Prime Minister Fukuda declared:

“Women’s active participation in, and contribution to, every area of society is essential to our country’s progress and development.  For that reason, I have formulated a domestic programme keeping in mind the resolution of the United Nations International Women’s Year Conference.

It is my firm intention to join with all Japanese in making greater efforts to improve the status and welfare of women.”

In reality, at many levels Japanese society still remained very male orientated and career opportunities for women were rather limited. Politicians in Japan were increasingly starting to talk up the need for change – mostly as a response to UN initiatives and the lobbying of pressure groups.

Education

The government saw this as a key area and Fukuda promised further education reform, liberalising the curriculum and improving examination systems.  In his 31 January 1977 speech he also announced his intention to promote sports, culture and the arts. “People are our national asset, and education is the keystone of our national policy” he declared. (See FCO 21/1564).

Defence Policy and Security

Japanese Defence Policy is reviewed in FCO 21/1519.  The period saw a continuing debate about improvements in the Self-Defence Forces, increased operational liaison with the US and a consideration of measures to combat terrorism. Opposition parties remained quick to pounce on any suggestion of increases in Japan’s defence spending.  Fukuda’s handling of the Japan Airlines Flight 472 hijacking when he announced on 1 October 1977 that he would accept the hijackers demands, contrasted with the US and European approach of non-negotiation with terrorists. The emphasis in the post Vietnam era was on reducing tensions and on international peace diplomacy.  Peter Westlake’s report on this can be found in FCO 21/1421.

<back