FOREIGN OFFICE FILES FOR JAPAN AND THE FAR EAST
Series Three: Embassy & Consular Archives - Japan (post 1945)
(Public Record Office Class FO 262)

Detailed Correspondence for 1945-1957 (PRO Class FO 262/2040-2132)

EXTRACTS FROM THE DOCUMENTS

The following extracts provide an insight into the type of material covered in these files:

Extract from interview with General Douglas MacArthur (FO 262/2056), Wednesday March 19,1947:

Question: “Would you care to elaborate a little more on the Peace Treaty. When do you think it should be?”

Answer (by MacArthur): “I will say as soon as possible. In Japan there is a functioning Government. But in Germany the Government had to be built from the ground up and there is no Government to sign the Peace Treaty ... over here there is no problem of what to do with Japan. She has been squeezed out pretty nearly of everything we can expect to squeeze out of her. I am not talking of the reparations now. But she has already lost Manchuria, Korea and Formosa. There is little left...” “The days of SCAP should cease completely with the Peace treaty because, I think, conditions are ripe for it now ...”

Question: How long would you say the United Nations would have to continue the controls of democratization?”

Answer: “I would not want to speculate that. The Japanese would accept it ... It would be considered protective rather than repressive. It would continue as long as it was munificent.”

“I would not envision any military formations of any sort after the Peace Treaty. Bayonet control would be a mockery...”

Extract from “Top Secret” Interview with J F Dulles on Peace Treaty (FO 262/2072):

"The U.S. Government believed that if Japan was subject to treaty restrictions which would perpetuate her as a second-class power, that would inevitably mean the passing of Japan at an early date to Russian communist control and the use of the very great facilities and capabilities of the Japanese nation to develop the Soviet war machine ... therefore in his judgement, a judgement which had been very carefully arrived at, the committal by Japan to the cause of the free world in the face of all the attractions both economic and military that could be set up in the adjacent mainland required that we should give to Japan the opportunity to develop again within an orbit as a first-class power. To deny this would be to lose Japan and thus the whole Pacific area. The defence of Australia, New Zealand and the Philippines required that we should give Japan this opportunity. On the other hand we were met by the fact that Australia and New Zealand did not want to give Japan that opportunity which we considered necessary for their own safety.”

Annotated minute at the foot of a confidential note 1955 from Basil Greenhill concerning Korea (FO 262/2114), 20 October:

"Clearly we can not hold a meeting between Heads of Commonwealth Missions and UNC without instructions and the time has perhaps come to ask London if they want us to hold one, or if they are prepared to tag along behind the Americans and run the risk of extra financial commitments. We might at the same time make the point that Mr Furley Smith can not now be released...”

Confidential minutes, concerning Korean claims (FO 262/2114), November 1955:

“After discussion with representatives of interested Commonwealth Governments here and with Brigadier Alderson and Colonel Daunt it was agreed that we had two points to make on the United Nations Command’s proposed reply to the Koreans (text at enclosure to 14 on the file, flagged A),

(1) That the reply should be amended so as to take account of the view that negotiations should not start before the basic principles governing them had been agreed with the ROK, (2) that the draft reply laid too much stress on past claims.

Brigadier Alderson agreed to make these points to the UN Command immediately and we reported our views to London. London in their telegram at 19, flagged B below, have now somewhat belatedly endorsed our views.”

[A hand-written annotation at the foot of the note states:]

“I agree the relationship between BCFK and UN Command seems to be most tenuous and should be improved, but the Americans can hardly be blamed for it all because both BCFK and the Commonwealth Governments have been very slow off the mark.

It is for consideration what form the ‘higher representation’ should take. I should be inclined to put it up to the UN Liaison Office here in the first instance, rather than suggest an approach to General Lemmitzer.”

Extract taken from an article in Nippon Times, 23 November, 1947:

“SCAP Headquarters uncovers hidden Government in Japan.

...and General MacArthur’s investigators have learned enough to know that the anti-democratic forces of Japan have utilised this historic system of control to pressure ‘old Japan’ and prevent change.

They know that the lines of control run from the little people who are the victims and have to pay the cost, to the gangsters, to the gang leaders, to the politicians., to the Diet, to the Cabinet, to the politicians who control the Cabinet, to super-gang leaders, to super-politicians and then someplace higher...”

Telegram from A D V Gascoigne, British Political Representative in Tokyo, to Mr Dening at the Foreign Office (FO 262/2056), March 1947:

GUARD. TOP SECRET

“General MacArthur, after showing me his reply to SEALF on this subject, said that he wished to give me, personally, some advice. He stressed that he was not giving this to His Majesty’s Government but to me. At the same time, he said that I might repeat it if I wished to you, but not (repeat not) as a message from him. Supreme Commander said that from perusal of SEALF’s reply it seemed obvious to him that the British did not mean to keep their pledge of completing repatriation of Japanese Surrendered Personnel from South East Asia by the end of 1947. From his intimate knowledge of this question, and of the repercussions which there had already been in the United States and in Japan (here he mentioned that the State Department had expressed most bitter feelings at our retention of these Japanese during 1947, and that he was being continually bombarded by the Japanese Prime Minister on the subject) he felt sure that the United Kingdom Government would find themselves most awkwardly placed in world opinion if their present pledge was not kept. He fully realized that the commander at Singapore was, quite naturally, only looking to the local advantages to be gained by retaining the personnel (advantages which he, MacArthur, felt were greatly exaggerated). In any case local benefit derived from services of 90,000 JSPs would be completely outweighed by world wide odium which would fall upon us. If we did not succeed in repatriating these personnel by the stipulated time there would be intense anti-British press campaign in the United States, and much anti-British propaganda in Japan. The Russians, who had agreed to repatriate not less than 50,000 a month from Russian controlled areas, were now speeding this up, and he thought that if we did not succeed in repatriating our Japanese by the end of this year that the Russians would probably ‘beat us to it’. General was really, and I think, sincerely, concerned over what he termed the ‘stain which would blemish the honour of the United Kingdom’ in the event of our not fulfilling our promise; he went so far as to say to me that if shipping and other facilities which he had now vouchsafed to SEALF were not sufficient, he might give some further assistance. He was trying to husband a reserve of some 50 Liberty ships in Japanese waters, which would be permanently stationed here in the event of trouble with Korea (for the transport of troops from Japan to Korea) from which he might draw.

Finally General stated that he hoped that I would not take the above amiss, and he assured me with emotion that he had only spoken in this way to me personally owing to his ‘intense admiration for the United Kingdom and their good name.

Please do not quote the above outside the Foreign Office. I feel that every possible effort should be made to complete this repatriation by the end of this year, and if you can authorize me to reassure the Supreme Commander that our agreement will indeed be most definitely honoured as regards the time limit I should be grateful. I can vouch for strong feelings which permeate both local American officials, and Japanese, regarding our delay in this repatriation.

Gascoigne”

Extract from a letter from UK Liaison Mission in Japan, to M E Dening at the Foreign Office in London (FO 262/2056), 11 December 1947:

“During an interview which Macrae and I held this morning with the Supreme Commander on the occasion of Macrae’s departure from Tokyo, MacArthur returned to the subject of the Japanese peace conference and spoke on the same lines as he had done to me on the 28th November.

After emphasising all that he had said before, MacArthur took one step forward by stating that in his opinion we could proceed to tackle the ‘laboratory part’ of of the Japanese peace conference without either Russia or China. He felt that this backroom period would last for at least six months, probably a year, and that by that time the world situation might quite possibly have changed in such a way as to bring both Russia and China in before the end. In any case he felt convinced that if we went ahead now China would be sure to come in at once and send her experts to discuss the preliminary drafting. As far as he could see therefore the decision as to whether we were to proceed to the signing of a treaty without Russia or China was not an ‘actual question’. The important thing was for us to go ahead with the preliminary work and to place confidence in the belief that those who were now ‘filibustering’ over questions of procedure would be constrained to join us before the zero hour.

MacArthur then pointed out rather obviously that the position of the world powers had changed since he had advocated an early peace with Japan on the 17th of March last. Since that date two clearly cut political and social ideologies had appeared in the world. The “Cominform” had taken shape with the result inter alia that Korea and Japan had become pawns between these two sharply defined ideologies. Thus the Korean question had at first been one to be decided between (a) Korea and (b) the Allies. But Korea as such had then quickly dropped out and had become a pawn to be struggled for between the Anglo-Saxon Allies versus Russia. Ultimately Korea would inevitably fall to Russia but the future of that country was now being wrangled over between the United Nations on the one hand and Russia on the other. In the case of Japan the Japanese question had at first been one between the Allies and Japan. It was now one between the Allies and Russia, and as in the case of Korea it would doubtless ultimately become a question to be disputed between the United Nations and Russia. The great difference however as regards the Japanese question was that whereas Korea would inevitably have to be allowed to become a Russian satellite this could never be permitted in the case of Japan. The Russians would doubtless endeavour by every means in their power to obtain control over Japan, the bulwark of the Western Pacific, but the United States would never permit metropolitan Japan or the adjacent islands such as Okinawa etc. to be dominated by Moscow, and he felt sure that we should most certainly agree.”

A minute sheet by A J Gascoigne that underlines the complex relationship between political and commercial affairs that prevailed during the Occupation (FO 262/2060), October 1948:

“EXPORT OF EXPLOSIVES FROM JAPAN

1. Mr Milne of the ICI came to see me on the 6th July, 1948, about this matter. The ICI office in Shanghai had informed him that a contract had been made between SCAP and the Kailan Mining Administration to supply:

6000/6500 cases of X22.5 dynamite

400,000 electric detonators

50,000 ordinary detonators

1,200,000 feet safety fuse.

2. Of this contract, a large amount had already been shipped and the rest would be delivered by the end of 1948. ICI, Shanghai, stated that they were worried because previously they had been the main suppliers to the Kailan Mining Administration and they did not appreciate this Japanese competition.

4 I saw the Industrial Division of ESS on the matter, and was told by Mr Morand that the FEC ruling, as Mr Morand understood it, allowed Japan to produce sufficient for domestic peaceful needs but also allowed Japan to export up to normal manufacturing surplus. Where Mr Morand got this definition from I do not know, and since I had not been able to trace the FEC ruling I was not able to dispute it.

5 However, Industrial Division, ESS, confirmed that it was not SCAP’s general policy to export explosives, because already Japan was having difficulty in meeting domestic needs owing to shortages of glycerine, etc. Industrial Division had received orders to provide for this export to China from a high level, in spite of their own dislike of the proposition. I gather that the negotiations were conducted by the Chinese Ambassador and the Supreme Commander because of the political necessity of maintaining the coal output of North China in the operations against the communists. undoubtedly SCAP’s need of North China coking coal (by which the explosives were to be paid for) had also something to do with the decision.

6 A few days later Mr Faulkner, the representative of the Kailan Mining Administration, arrived in Tokyo and I discussed the matter with him. He was in Japan to buy pit props for the North China mines (in which he was unsuccessful) and not primarily interested in explosives. His version of the explosives deal was that the Kailan Mining Administration had been forced to turn to Japan for their explosives because they were quite unable to obtain Sterling exchange permits from the Chinese authorities to buy explosives from England. He would have preferred to buy ICI explosives because the Japanese explosives were not satisfactory. However, in the emergency his company had turned to SCAP with pressing political considerations and had obtained their explosives...

7 The total contract made by SCAP with the Kailan Mining Administration absorbed only a fractional amount of the Japanese output which, however, owing to domestic shortages, had to be drawn from the meagre explosives reserve in Japan. Industrial Division, ESS, do not like the contract and do not wish to see it repeated. A high level policy decision in SCAP brought it about. The spacing of shipments over different months gives the appearance of a number of continuing contracts, but this is illusory and has been due to the inadequacy of Japanese supplies.

8 Although a policy decision of the far eastern Commission has been contravened, there would seem to be little benefit in taking up the matter with the supreme Commander now, since the original object of maintaining the North China coal output in face of Communist pressure seems to have been achieved, and a repetition of the contract does not appear likely.

A J G

2nd October, 1948.”

<Back