FOREIGN OFFICE FILES: UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

Series Three: The Cold War

(Public Record Office Class FO 371 and Related Files)

Part 2: The Prague Spring and Soviet Intervention in Czechoslovakia, 1967-1968

Extracts from the Documents

Howard Smith’s minutes on Czechoslovakia, 28 August 1968. (FCO 28/110):

“The publication of the communiqué on the Moscow talks has created in Czechoslovakia a mood of anger and bitterness which the speeches by Svoboda and Dubcek have not yet succeeded in dispelling. There have been demonstrations in Prague which, however, have not led to bloodshed...”

Comments on the communiqué published on 4 October 1968. (FCO 28/69):

“The communiqué published on 4 October after the Soviet-Czechoslovak talks in Moscow gave some indication of the general areas in which the Czechoslovaks had had to make further concessions to Soviet demands. But there may still be scope for differing interpretations. Although the Czechoslovaks seem to have been forced to agree to tighten control of the mass media further, it is by no means certain that they have abandoned all their proposed reforms or agreed to stifle by increased controls in the Party and Government all the liberalising pressures which still exist in the country.

The Czechoslovak leaders have also now publicly accepted that some of the Allied troops will remain indefinitely in Czechoslovakia. Although the Czechoslovak Minister of Defence, General Dzur is reported to have said that some troop withdrawals will be complete by 28 October (the 50th Anniversary of the Foundation of the Czechoslovak Republic), no definite date has been given for the start of the withdrawals. There are no signs of any substantial movement of troops out of the country.”

I F Porter, a representative of the UK Delegation to the Eighteen Nation Disarmament Conference, in Geneva, reports on his discussions with Lahoda, to Howard Smith, in the Northern Department, Foreign Office, 5 September 1968. (FCO 28/110):

“Lahoda, the Czech Number Two, told me last night that his Foreign Minister would probably return to Prague during the next few days. Meanwhile his Ambassador was with him at Berne. In view of the Moscow attacks on Hajek I thought this a little surprising but Lahoda was inclined to laugh them off. This, in the words of Le Monde, was ‘un drôle d’occupation’. So far as he and his friends could tell no one had yet been arrested (he repeated this when I reverted to it later), the majority of the Praesidium were still progressist, Dubcek was still Prime Minister, you heard the same voices as before on Radio Prague, they still read out passages from the London ‘Times’ on Czechoslovakia and Russia and there were very few collaborators. To have Russian friendship for 4-5 years in exchange for Czech mistrust for the rest of your life was not worth the candle; some people had learnt this lesson during the Nazi occupation. The ‘4-5 years’ came out quite naturally. When I asked him whether he really thought the process, started under Dubcek, would go on he said he did. Dubcek was a bit of an idealist and the press had gone wild—which was natural enough after being muzzled for so long. There would be a pause but no question of going back to Novotny conditions. They would, of course, have to be careful not to bring about a second stage of occupation...”

Lahoda’s optimism at this stage was somewhat ill-founded. Spirits had been severely dampened by the Moscow communiqué, signed at the end of August. This document confirmed the failure of the Prague Spring. Lahoda thought in terms of a “pause”, rather than an end to reform. The reformists tried to cling to some of their planned constitutional measures. They met with limited success with the introduction of a new federal system on January 1, 1969 and the creation of two separate Czech and Slovak Republics. Yet two months later, the Federal Assembly adopted three further laws curtailing and undermining the federation. The new measures ensured strict centralisation of the State administration. The next seventeen years were to be one of the bleakest periods of Czech and Slovak history.

Bilak’s Statement on Events Leading up to August 1968. (FCO 28/618):

“Today’s ‘Tribuna’ and ‘Rude Pravo’ publish a testimony by Comrade Vasil Bilak, member of the CPCz Central Committee Praesidium and Central Committee Secretary. The interview, headed “From Dresden to Bratislava”, was prepared by Oldrich Svestka and Zdenek Horeni. In the introduction, they say:

An article [Note: by Oldrich Svestka] about the events of the fateful night of 20th to 21st August, and an interview with Comrade Oldrich Cernik indicated a series of significant circumstances in our domestic political development between January and August 1968, and in their way contributed toward a broader and more intimate view of questions posed by the party and society. Striving to make this picture as objective as possible, the editorial board of ‘Tribuna’ submits to its readers and, at the same time, also to the readers of ‘Rude Pravo’, an interview with Comrade Vasil Bilak, member of the CPCz Central Committee Praesidium and Central Committee Secretary. Its topic deals primarily with international policy.

[Question:] Comrade Bilak, between January and August 1968 there were a number of summit meetings between our representatives and those of the socialist countries. At all of them Czechoslovakia was discussed. In your view, what was the motive of this interest? Many people think that the motive was the democratisation process, for instance.

[Bilak:] To assert that our allies did not approve of the correction of wrongs is, I think one of the great frauds which certain people tried to impose on the honest citizens of our fatherland with the help of the press, radio and television. They did so first of all to create the impression that the fraternal parties of the socialist countries were attempting to interfere in our internal affairs, and, second, as if they had objected to the healthy process which began to develop in our country under the leadership of the CPCz after January 1968. It is now difficult to believe that our leadership did not energetically refute these views. Any socialist country, and the Soviet Union in particular, has a sincere and selfless interest in the prosperity of its socialist allies—in their achieving successes in their political and economic development. Although all socialist countries differ from each other because of a series of national characteristics, special national developments, and other historical facts, they are mutually linked by their international interests, ideology and aims. The success of one country is the success of all. On the other hand, none of them can be neutral or indifferent when another allied country is threatened...”

Interview with Colonel Viliam Šalgovic, former Chairman of the Slovak Party Central Committee Control and Auditing Commission. (FCO 28/618):

“… Mr Šalgovic recalls that on 4 May 1968 Mr Brezhnev told Mr Dubcek and other members of the delegation very clearly that Czechoslovakia could not under any circumstances “fall out” of the socialist system. Mr Šalgovic explained that he left with his family on 3 August, 1968, to Burgas in Bulgaria to spend his holidays and returned back on 17 August. This was with the approval of the appropriate department of the Central Committee. He was not and he could not be one of those who allegedly invited the allied troops to Czechoslovakia. Their arrival did not depend on whether he wanted it or not. He believed that the decision was made by the leadership of the Communist Parties and Governments of the fraternal socialist countries...”

Letter from the British Embassy, Rome, dated 7 October 1969, regarding a speech on Czechoslovakia by Italian Foreign Minister. (FCO 28/571):

“...Moro then referred to the protest movement within Czechoslovakia and to the measures taken to repress it. Political problems could not be resolved by force: the Italian Government would continue to pay close attention to every phase of this difficult situation which, in a certain sense, was the ‘touchstone’ for any real possibility of creating a constructive European dialogue. If one sincerely believed in the cause of détente and friendship with the peoples of Eastern Europe then one could only regard it as one’s duty to judge and censure what had occurred in Czechoslovakia. Human rights and the prospect of European political evolution were at stake. Moro then concluded this section of his speech with the statement referred to by the Czech spokesman...”

<back