SPECIAL OPERATIONS EXECUTIVE, 1940-1946

Series 1, Special Operations in Western Europe

Part 1: France: The Jedburgh Teams and Operation Overlord, 1944-1945,

Part 2: France: Political and Planning Files, Circuits and Missions, 1940-1947

Part 3: Germany, 1936-1945

Part 4: Holland, 1940-1949

Part 5: Italy, 1941-1948

Publisher's Note - Part 3

Part 3 provides complete coverage of SOE records relating to Germany. Until the release of files HS 6/617-722, very little was known of the workings and operations of X Section, the SOE country division for Germany. By studying the archives, academics will be able to research the directorate’s aims and objectives; firstly the ruination of the Third Reich and, secondly, for SOE to secure a role in a liberated Europe and post-war Germany. The link between the two is reported in HS 6/622:

“If this policy (of obtaining information on underground movements) develops, it looks as if fully trained X Section personnel now in the field, and additional German-speaking SOE personnel, may be eventually required for real active work in Germany. This is a very definite change in our role…”

File HS 6/692 covers the early work of X Section between 1940-1943. Detailing weekly and monthly progress reports, historians will be able to study the effectiveness of SOE activities in Germany throughout the first half of the war. During this period, the high command in London generally thought that the infiltration of the Third Reich was not a feasible undertaking. The turning point for SOE operations in the ‘ruling country’ mainly occurred from 1944 onwards, pre- and post- D-Day.

The organisation of X Section is covered in HS 6/621, 635-636, and 639-640, including SOE directives, policy and planning documents.

The first reel of Part 3 (Reel 24) includes files HS 6/617-620. These chiefly concern the politics behind the armistice and military surrenders negotiated through SOE work. Detailing peace feelers (including von Trott and Moltke) and German approaches, the documents report that the former were in themselves no concern to SOE but primarily of interest to the Foreign Office. HS 6/617 states, “we have agreed that as soon as the Germans put out feelers of this kind, our Agents will immediately refuse to discuss any questions of peace terms with the individuals or groups concerned until they have received further instructions from London.” The files also reveal SOE’s opinion that most of the approaches made by the Germans were calculated in order to serve the purposes of counter-espionage, espionage, to gain information on allied policy for peace terms and propaganda.

To complement this, the German Committee Minutes (HS 6/621) include the use by X Section of various German political organisations, such as the communists, social democrats and trade unions, in order to gain manpower and create a network of ‘resistance’. Scholars will be able to research the role played in operations by the German working classes (who were thought to have anti-Nazi leanings), and related groups such as the International Transport Workers Federation (HS 6/647-648).

Sabotage missions behind enemy lines are also included in Part 3. The destruction of rail networks, machinery and the attempted destruction of the factory producing components for the V2 rockets (HS 6/662 and 663) are included and give fascinating insights into the workings of X Section in the final stages of the war. Operations DOWNEND, FORDWICK, FRILFORD, COLAN, CARHAM and CLINT can all be used to study the success/failure of missions in Germany.

Operations BRADDOCK I and II (HS 6/637, 719-722) detail the proposal to scatter four million incendiaries (from Lancaster bombers) over various locations in Germany after D-Day. Backed by SHAEF and the PWE, the devices came complete with full instructions written in 11 languages. The intention was for the incendiaries to float down and be picked up by anti-Nazis and forced labourers for use in sabotage attacks. The ensuing explosions, not to mention the waste of German resources in searching for them, would cause immeasurable disruption to the enemy. Judging from the files, the operation did not take place; it was deemed that the most suitable time for the operation to prove successful “had passed”.

Files concerning agents and double agents enable scholars to research the theories and existence of espionage, counter-espionage and counter-intelligence. Several operations were undertaken using neutral countries, such as Switzerland, as exit/escape routes.

HS 6/646 looks at the case of ‘Lily’ and ‘Harry’. Both were German nationals operating in Sweden and used by the allies to gain intelligence. The papers show how SOE was suspicious of Lily’s intentions and movement in German circles in Stockholm. File HS 6/649 studies the credibility and exploits of ‘Sam’ and ‘Edward’ - two Swedish sabotage ‘agents’.

HS 6/702 documents the arrival of enemy agents in Britain. The discovery of the body of Jan Willem Ter Braak in Cambridge, fuelled speculation behind SOE’s belief that “The Germans have developed the informer system to almost a fine art.” The file can also be used to study German contra-espionage methods and the use of ‘agents provocateurs’.

In HS 6/699 scholars will be able to follow the progress of the Demuth Committee. As a joint venture with the PWE, SOE paid the marginal fee of £50.00 per month in order to support the Committee in their objective for the secret services to employ anti-Nazi civil servants, professional men and leading economic experts in espionage operations.

What the files undoubtedly prove is that SOE was actively pressing for a mission to assassinate Hitler and his chief subordinates. Known as Operations FOXLEY and LITTLE FOXLEY respectively, files HS 6/623-626 document the feasibility study made by Section X in 1944 to kill Hitler by sniper, poison or train derailment. Following on from a previously failed attempt within Germany to assassinate the ruler, the u-turn in Allied policy targeted Hitler’s alpine retreat, Berchtesgaden, as the most obvious location for the mission to take place. SOE plans were supported by Duff Cooper. Reflecting this the documents include a full implementation and intelligence report, with details of the Führer’s daily routine and eating habits, aerial photographs, maps and scale drawings, security personnel, air-raid shelters and even details of German uniforms. The plan, of course, never reached fruition - Hitler’s failing strategies meant that he was more use alive than dead. Also, there was no wish to create a martyr cult. Plans to deal with Hitler’s subordinates, including Goebbels found favour (LITTLE FOXLEY), but were never implemented.

Files HS 6/627-633 look at SOE intelligence reports on concentration and death camps. As the end of the war came into sight, finding out the fate of missing agents became a prime concern for SOE. The archives include reports from liberated agents, and the interrogation of suspects on conditions and whereabouts of colleagues. Atrocities concerning Auschwitz, Dachau and Buchenwald are also included.

Documents HS 6/689 and 690 study the work of Military Establishment 42 (ME 42). As part of the German directorate, ME 42 was seen by some to be an extension of SOE. Its objective was to make the cross-over from resistance work to intelligence work by searching for missing agents after the war, in the prospect of securing a post-war role for SOE. The department never fully materialised - British and American troops liberated many agents before ME 42 could reach them.

The use of propaganda in the Second World War is a huge area of research in itself. One of the most successful operations ever undertaken is included in Part 3 in file HS 6/641. This documents the forged six-pfennig postage stamp portraying the head of Himmler. It was produced by the PWE in order to cause maximum disruption within the internal powers of the Third Reich. The stamp was used to send letters (all baring the German postmark) to various organisations and philatelists in Europe. Secret organisations such as SOE claimed ignorance, which only encouraged the press to believe that the stamps were produced in Germany and that Himmler would actually climb to complete power in the Reich. Files HS 6/694-696 also look at propaganda for Germany between 1942-1944, including forgeries, itching powder on German soldiers in central Crete, information rumours and the sexual defamation of the Nazi leadership.

The use of BBC radio broadcasts for propaganda purposes were of vital importance for SOE work in Germany. HS 6/637 documents instructions for the BBC to air a five minute broadcast every two hours. “It is of the greatest importance that we, not BBC officials, should have the final say in what is transmitted to Germany.” This demand made by SOE to control broadcast copy can be seen in the following extract:

“We must also be allowed the power to cut from all broadcasts such phrases as ‘our fight is not against you but against Hitler’ and to substitute such phrases as ‘you, the German people, stand convicted before the whole world. You, the German people, by your cowardice or inertia have permitted your Government to launch the most bloody war in history.’ ”

Part 3 of this microfilm project will enable scholars to study:

- German politics and a post-war German Government
- SOE’s relationship with OSS, SHAEF, DGER, PWE and the Foreign Office
- Underground organisations of the Nazi Government
- Sabotage of communication networks
- the role of the International Transport Workers Federation and the Internationale Sozialistische Kampf-bund personnel, in Germany, Switzerland and Sweden
- The role played by neutral countries such as Switzerland
- Propaganda
- Counter-intelligence and Counter-espionage
- The feasibility of assassination plots, such as Operation FOXLEY, the plan to kill Hitler
- The question of using French officers/escaped Prisoners of War, in the Allied forces
- SOE covert activities in liberated areas
- The future of SOE in a post-war Europe
- The training of agents in France (Centre 20)
- Prisoners of war and concentration camps

Due to the sensitive nature of the material, several files are still retained by the Department under Section 3(4). However, most documents have been released and are included in this project. The documents offered in Part 3 invite academics to study SOE in an area previously thought, by the London high command, to be out of reach. Was SOE successful in its operations in Germany? How feasible was the plot to assassinate Hitler? Should it have gone ahead? To what lengths did SOE rely on the German populace in order to carry out their missions? Did the work of X Section secure a role for SOE and sabotage work in a post-war world?

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